This order decides only the revision against the trial court's refusal to release the premises. It does not decide whether any offence was committed, the fate of the seized drugs or machines, or the release application itself — the trial court must decide that application afresh, expeditiously, in accordance with the observations. The criminal case continues.
- Case
- Payal Sharma v. State of U.P. & Ors.
- Court
- High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026:AHC:227922
- Bench
- Sanjiv Kumar
- Judgment by
- Sanjiv Kumar
- Case numbers
- Criminal Revision No. 8039 of 2025
- Outcome
- Criminal Revision No. 8039 of 2025 allowed: the Special Judge (Drugs and Cosmetics Act)/Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 9, Agra's order dated 22.05.2025 rejecting the release application is set aside; the trial court is directed to decide the release application afresh, in the light of the observations and in accordance with law, expeditiously.
Revision allowed: indefinite sealing has no legal basis; release application to be decided afresh
On 3 November 2026, Justice Sanjiv Kumar of the Allahabad High Court allowed a criminal revision by Payal Sharma and set aside a trial court order refusing to release her premises, which had been sealed for more than two years in a drugs case.
The Court held that no provision in the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, or the Code of Criminal Procedure authorises sealing immovable property for an indefinite period, and that preventive sealing without an existing violation and lawful statutory authority violates Article 300A of the Constitution. The trial court was directed to decide the release application afresh, in the light of the observations and in accordance with law, expeditiously.
Premises sealed in July 2023; the owner was never an accused
The revision was filed against an order dated 22 May 2025 of the Special Judge (Drugs and Cosmetics Act)/Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 9, Agra, rejecting Application No. 1855 of 2025 filed by the revisionist seeking release of the seized immovable property.
The underlying case, Case Crime No. 348 of 2023, was registered under the NDPS Act and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, at Police Station Jagdishpura, District Agra. The revisionist is the owner of the disputed property. She is neither named in the FIR nor an accused in the case, and no charge-sheet has been filed against her.
According to the prosecution, illegal cough syrups, narcotic substances, machines, equipment and other materials were recovered from the property, after which it was sealed along with the machines and equipment found there. The premises were raided on 8 July 2023 and sealed the same day. The revisionist submitted that more than two years later, the authorities had neither removed the machines, nor recorded any evidence, nor released the property to its rightful owner.
Can premises be sealed indefinitely on the apprehension of future misuse?
The revisionist submitted that the trial court had passed the impugned order without applying its judicial mind, that no provision in either Act authorises the sealing of premises, and that sealing for securing evidence can only be temporary, not permanent. She relied on Nevada Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra ((2019) 20 SCC 119) and Narayan Power Solutions v. Union of India (2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1499).
The State, through the Additional Government Advocate, submitted that there was no illegality or infirmity in the order, because the premises were seized on the apprehension that they might be misused in future. The trial court had rejected the release application on that sole ground — a strong possibility that the property would be misused if released.
The statutory survey: search and seizure powers stop short of sealing
The Court examined each statute in turn. Under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, Sections 22(1)(c) and 22(2A) empower the concerned Inspector to direct a person not to dispose of the stock of drugs for a period of twenty days — but no provision of that Act was brought to the Court's notice authorising the sealing of immovable property.
Under the NDPS Act, Section 42(1)(c) permits seizure of the drug or substance and materials used in its manufacture, along with any other article, animal or conveyance liable to confiscation; Section 63(1) provides for confiscation where the accused is convicted, acquitted or discharged and the Court decides an article is liable to confiscation; Section 68F provides for seizure or freezing of illegally acquired property, after following the prescribed procedure; and Section 68Z provides for release of property in certain cases. Nothing on record showed the property was sealed in compliance with any of these provisions.
The Supreme Court in Nevada Properties had clarified that the general police power to seize property under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding to Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) does not include the power to attach, lock or seal immovable property on the mere suspicion of an offence. The Bombay High Court in Narayan Power Solutions had held, in the customs context, that the power of search under Section 105 of the Customs Act does not include a power to seal premises — sealing is a drastic action that tinkers with the substantive right to hold, use and occupy immovable property, and a power to seal cannot be assumed where the legislature has confined the power to search.
Sealing may be temporary, not permanent; Article 300A requires authority of law
The Court held that no provision was brought to its notice empowering an Inspector to lock or seal a building permanently on the apprehension that the owner might manufacture or sell illegal drugs in the future. Sealing of property may be a temporary measure, but it cannot be permanent unless permitted under law.
Preventive sealing of immovable property in the absence of an existing violation and lawful statutory authority violates Article 300A of the Constitution, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law: to seal or attach a property, there must be an existing violation or an express statutory provision authorising such action, and the procedure prescribed by law must be followed.
The State's counsel could not point out any provision under the Acts or the Code under which the property could be sealed for an indefinite period on the ground that the offence might be repeated. Since the trial court had rejected the release application solely on the ground that the property might be misused in future, the finding on which the application was rejected had no legal basis.
The revision was accordingly allowed, the impugned order set aside, and the trial court directed to decide the release application afresh, expeditiously, in the light of the observations and in accordance with law.
What the order does not decide
The order does not release the premises itself, and it does not decide whether any offence was committed, what should happen to the seized drugs, machines and equipment, or whether the release application should ultimately be allowed. Those questions remain for the trial court, which must decide the application afresh on the law as explained by the High Court.
The criminal proceedings arising from Case Crime No. 348 of 2023 continue unaffected.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students: seizure is not sealing, and suspicion is not authority
The distinction at the heart of this order is between seizure of a thing and sealing of a place. Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lets the police seize property discovered in circumstances creating suspicion of an offence — the power attaches to the article, not to the building that contains it. Nevada Properties confines that power accordingly: locking or sealing immovable property is a different and more drastic interference, and it needs its own statutory source.
The Court's survey of the two Acts shows how to test for such a power — look for the precise power (search, seizure, freezing, confiscation), the procedure that conditions it, and the time limit that bounds it, such as the twenty-day direction in Section 22 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Where the legislature has granted a bounded power, the Court will not infer an unbounded one. The second lesson is about Article 300A: any deprivation of property must rest on authority of law — and 'the offence might be repeated' is a prediction, not an authority. Note also the remedy: the Court remitted the application for fresh decision rather than ordering release itself.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the Court hold that the continued sealing of the premises was illegal, and which provisions did it examine and find wanting?
- What does Nevada Properties say about the scope of the police power to seize property under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
- Why did the Court remit the release application for fresh decision instead of ordering the premises released itself?
