This judgment decides only the confiscation proceedings and the compensation for the illegal confiscation. It does not decide the pending criminal case (Case Crime No. 165 of 2023) or whether any offence under the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 was committed. The vehicle is to be released only if it is not required in connection with any other case.
- Case
- Tej Prakash v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
- Court
- High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026:AHC:228068
- Bench
- Sandeep Jain
- Judgment by
- Sandeep Jain
- Case numbers
- Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 22141 of 2026
- Outcome
- Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 22141 of 2026 allowed: the District Magistrate, Mirzapur's confiscation order dated 22.11.2024 and the Commissioner, Vindhyachal Division's appellate order dated 21.05.2026 are quashed; the vehicle is to be released, preferably within one week of production of a certified copy; compensation of Rs 40,000 per month from 18.09.2023 till actual release plus a consolidated Rs 25,000 is payable within one month, failing which simple interest at 8% per annum applies.
Confiscation quashed; vehicle to be released with compensation for lost livelihood
On 3 November 2026, Justice Sandeep Jain of the Allahabad High Court allowed a writ petition by Tej Prakash and quashed the confiscation of his goods vehicle, holding that the proceedings suffered from patent illegality, complete non-application of mind and misinterpretation of the statutory provisions.
The District Magistrate, Mirzapur's order dated 22 November 2024 confiscating the vehicle, and the Commissioner, Vindhyachal Division's appellate order dated 21 May 2026 affirming it, were both set aside. The vehicle is to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case, and the State must pay compensation of Rs 40,000 per month from seizure until actual release, plus a consolidated Rs 25,000 for mental agony, harassment and avoidable litigation.
A goods vehicle seized in Mirzapur, and two orders that did not agree on the facts
Tej Prakash is the registered owner of a DCM Eicher goods vehicle, registration number UP-50-CT-4205, used for transporting goods. It was seized by police of Police Station Vindhyachal, District Mirzapur, on 18 September 2023, while allegedly transporting two bullocks for slaughter to West Bengal. An FIR was registered the same day, Case Crime No. 165 of 2023, under the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, and the Indian Penal Code.
The District Magistrate, Mirzapur, confiscated the vehicle on 22 November 2024, recording that two bullocks had been found in it being transported cruelly and that it was used for smuggling animals for illegal gains; the petitioner had not appeared in the proceedings. His appeal was dismissed by the Commissioner, Vindhyachal Division, on 21 May 2026 — but the appellate authority recorded a different fact, that ten cows and their progeny were being illegally transported.
The petitioner had bought the vehicle on a loan from Magma Fincorp Limited (now Poonawalla Fincorp Limited), paying monthly instalments of Rs 27,709. He said the confiscation deprived him of his only source of livelihood, left him unable to pay the instalments, and exposed him to penal interest.
Was there any legal material for confiscation at all?
The principal question was whether any legal material showed the cattle were being transported outside Uttar Pradesh for slaughter.
The State defended the orders; the petitioner submitted there was no evidence the animals were being taken to West Bengal for slaughter, no evidence of cruelty, and no ground for confiscation.
The statutory scheme: permits only for transport out of the State
Section 5-A(1) of the 1955 Act prohibits transporting a cow, bull or bullock from any place within Uttar Pradesh to any place outside the State, except under a permit issued by an authorised officer. Section 5-A(7) empowers the District Magistrate to confiscate a vehicle used in violation of the Act, and Section 5-A(10) raises a presumption of guilt once the prosecution proves that beef or cow remains were in the accused's possession and the transported things are confirmed to be beef by the competent authority or authorised laboratory.
The Supreme Court held in Saurabh Bajaj v. State of Chhattisgarh (2026 SCC OnLine SC 2054) that the mere absence of documents accompanying cattle transport does not by itself give rise to a presumption of slaughter; the reverse burden arises only once the prosecution first establishes the essential ingredients of the offence. This Court's earlier decisions — Kaliya (2023), Kailash Yadav (2008), Mohd. Shakib and Munib (2024) — settle that no permit is required to transport cow and its progeny within Uttar Pradesh.
Three failures: destination, cruelty and the statutory presumption
First, on destination: the vehicle was intercepted within the territorial limits of District Mirzapur, and the authorities reasoned that, since Mirzapur adjoins the neighbouring State of Bihar, the animals must necessarily have been intended for West Bengal. The Court held that such a conclusion rested merely on conjectures and surmises, wholly unsupported by independent evidence, and that the existence of an inter-State boundary by itself cannot constitute proof of illegal transportation.
Second, on cruelty: the authorities had found the animals were transported in a cruel manner, but the two bullocks had never been examined by any veterinary doctor and no veterinary examination report was on record. Without any medical report, the allegation of cruelty was unsupported by cogent evidence.
Third, on the presumption: admittedly neither beef nor remains of slaughtered cow and its progeny were recovered from the vehicle, so the foundational facts necessary to draw the statutory presumption under Section 5-A(10) were completely absent and the burden never shifted to the petitioner. Rule 16 leaves no room for ambiguity — a permit is required only for transport from within Uttar Pradesh to a place outside the State — and the confiscating authority had overlooked this settled position. Confiscation deprives a person of property to which he is entitled to retain, and Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
Compensation for a livelihood taken away: Rs 40,000 a month plus Rs 25,000
The matter did not end with setting aside the confiscation orders. The petitioner had pleaded that the vehicle was his sole source of livelihood, a fact the respondents had not specifically denied, and the loan account statement substantiated that he was paying substantial monthly instalments and had been exposed to penal interest. Article 21 protects not merely life but also the right to livelihood.
Relying on Nilabati Behera ((1993) 2 SCC 746), Sube Singh ((2006) 3 SCC 178) and Indibily Creative ((2020) 12 SCC 436), the Court held that constitutional courts are fully empowered to award compensation in public law where State instrumentalities, by arbitrary and illegal exercise of statutory powers, deprive a citizen of a legitimate means of earning a livelihood. Assessing the petitioner's monthly loss at Rs 40,000, it directed compensation at that rate from 18 September 2023, the date of seizure, until actual release, plus an additional consolidated Rs 25,000 for mental agony, harassment and avoidable litigation, payable within one month of production of a certified copy, failing which simple interest at 8% per annum applies.
The vehicle is to be released preferably within one week of production of a certified copy, if not required in any other case. The State Government may also hold a departmental inquiry and, if responsibility is fixed on any officer, recover the compensation and interest from the officer or officers found responsible, after complying with the principles of natural justice.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students: presumptions need foundations, and compensation is a public-law remedy
Three doctrinal points repay study. First, the burden-shifting structure of Section 5-A(10): a statutory presumption is not a shortcut around proof. The prosecution must first establish the foundational facts — here, that beef or cow remains were in the accused's possession and confirmed to be beef — before any burden shifts to the accused. Saurabh Bajaj makes the same point for the Chhattisgarh Act.
Second, the territorial limit in Section 5-A(1) and Rule 16: the permit regime bites only on movement from Uttar Pradesh to outside the State, so an interception inside the State, without positive evidence of an out-of-State destination, cannot sustain confiscation — and the two authorities below could not even agree on how many animals were involved, two bullocks against ten cows.
Third, compensation in writ jurisdiction: Nilabati Behera and its line treat monetary compensation as a public-law remedy for established infringement of Article 21, distinct from a private-law damages suit. The Court quantified loss on the evidence — the loan instalments and the earning capacity of a commercial vehicle — and left it open to the State to inquire and, if responsibility were fixed, recover from the officers concerned.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the Court hold that no permit was required for the transport in this case, and which provision makes the permit requirement turn on inter-State movement?
- What three evidentiary gaps did the Court identify in the confiscation orders, and why did each of them matter?
- On what basis did the Court award compensation, and what two components does the award have?
