This judgment decides only whether a prima facie case exists at the discharge stage. It does not hold that any offence is proved, and it leaves the applicant's contention that the relationship was consensual to be evaluated at trial. The discussion of the 2026 amendment is confined to the law as it stood on the dates of the alleged incidents, 28 and 30 October 2025.
- Case
- Vishal Sunil Ingle v. State of Maharashtra
- Court
- High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench)
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026:BHC-NAG:15063
- Bench
- Mehroz K. Pathan
- Judgment by
- Mehroz K. Pathan
- Case numbers
- Crl. Rev. Appln. 270/2026
- Outcome
- Criminal Revision Application No. 270 of 2026 dismissed. The order dated 6 July 2026 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Akot, rejecting the applicant's discharge application under Section 250 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, stands; the applicant faces trial in Crime No. 493 of 2025 on charges under Sections 75, 296 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, read with Section 18(D) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019.
The decision
A single judge of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur, Justice Mehroz K. Pathan, has dismissed a criminal revision application challenging the rejection of a discharge application, holding that allegations of sexual harassment and outraging the modesty of a woman can be sustained even where the complainant is a transgender person who identifies herself as a woman.
The judgment, delivered on 3 November 2026 in Criminal Revision Application No. 270 of 2026, leaves the Additional Sessions Judge, Akot's order of 6 July 2026 intact: the applicant, Vishal Sunil Ingle, will face trial on charges under Sections 75, 296 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, read with Section 18(D) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019.
The complaint
The case arises from a report lodged on 1 November 2025 at Akot (Rural) police station in Akola district. The complainant, a transgender person, alleged that the applicant — who was serving in the Indian Army as an Agniveer — had become friendly with her, proposed marriage, and, on the pretext of marriage, committed forcible sexual intercourse with her on 28 October 2025. It was further alleged that on 30 October 2025 the applicant called her to Akot Bus Stand, took her on a motorbike to a flat, and again had sexual intercourse with her while abusing her. The report records that the complainant had taken medicines to develop breasts and, since 2021, had worn girls' dresses.
On that report, the police registered Crime No. 493 of 2025 for offences under Sections 75, 296 and 351(2) of the BNS read with Section 18(D) of the Transgender Persons Act, 2019. The applicant sought discharge under Section 250 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, before the Additional Sessions Judge, Akot. That application was rejected on 6 July 2026, and the applicant challenged the rejection in revision before the High Court.
The questions
Two questions arose. First, can an offence under Section 75 of the BNS — which deals with sexual harassment — be made out where the complainant is a transgender person rather than a woman as defined in Section 235 of the BNS, which defines “woman” as a female human being of any age? The applicant argued that it could not, and that Section 75 was therefore not attracted.
Second, does it matter that the complainant obtained a certificate of identity as a transgender person only on 12 February 2026, after the alleged incidents of 28 and 30 October 2025? The applicant contended that the offence under the Transgender Persons Act could not be made out, since the complainant had been declared transgender only after the alleged assaults. He also contended that, even taken at face value, the allegations showed a consensual relationship entered into on a promise of marriage, and that the BNS contains no provision corresponding to Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which the Supreme Court struck down in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 1.
Self-identification, not certification
The Court began with the definition in Section 2(k) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, which defines a transgender person as a person whose gender does not match the gender assigned at birth, and expressly includes transgender men and transgender women, whether or not they have undergone sex reassignment surgery, hormone therapy, laser therapy or any other therapy. The definition also covers persons with socio-cultural identities such as kinner, hijra, aravani and jogta.
On that definition, a person may identify as a transgender person — including as a transgender woman — even without a certificate of identity. Section 5 of the 2019 Act provides only an enabling mechanism for applying to the District Magistrate for a certificate; the certificate issued to the complainant on 12 February 2026 did not create the identity. The mere fact that the complainant did not hold a certificate at the time of the alleged offences would not, by itself, preclude invoking the penal provisions of the 2019 Act, and the allegations in the FIR prima facie attracted Section 18(D).
The Court relied on National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 483, in which the Supreme Court held that it is entirely for a transgender person to self-identify their gender and that this self-determination cannot be questioned by others. Section 4 of the 2019 Act, as it stood before the 2026 amendment, expressly recognised a transgender person's right to self-perceived gender identity. The complainant had identified herself as a woman, had undergone hormonal treatment in furtherance of that identity, and had since obtained a certificate of identity from the District Magistrate under Section 5 of the 2019 Act. That self-determination, the Court said, could not be questioned at the discharge stage.
The 2026 amendment
The Court also dealt with an intervening change in the statute. The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026, which received the President's assent on 30 March 2026, omitted sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the 2019 Act — the provision recognising the right to self-perceived gender identity. But that sub-section was in force on the dates of the alleged incidents, 28 and 30 October 2025, and on the date the FIR was registered, 1 November 2025. The acts attributed to the applicant therefore constituted an offence under the law as it stood at the relevant time; whether the prosecution can establish the offence on the evidence collected is a matter to be assessed during the trial.
The outcome
On the FIR, the Court found direct allegations of outraging the modesty of the complainant, who identifies as a woman following hormone therapy, so that an offence under Section 75 of the BNS was prima facie made out, as was the offence under Section 18(D) of the 2019 Act. The charge-sheet, the Court said, showed sufficient evidence to proceed against the applicant.
The submission that the relationship was consensual is a matter to be evaluated during the trial, the Court held. Finding no case for interference with the Sessions Judge's well-reasoned order rejecting discharge, the Court dismissed the revision application. The discharge stands rejected, and the case will proceed to trial.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
Discharge is a threshold test, not a trial. At this stage the court asks only whether the material on record, taken at its highest, discloses a prima facie case — it does not weigh the evidence or decide consent. That is why the Court could hold the charges maintainable while leaving the applicant's consent argument entirely open for trial.
The judgment is also a useful map of how the 2019 Act works: identity is a matter of self-perception under Section 4 (as it then stood), the certificate under Sections 5 and 6 is an enabling document rather than the source of the identity, and the definition in Section 2(k) is deliberately wide — it covers transgender men and women regardless of medical transition, and named socio-cultural identities. A later omission does not rewrite the law that governed the conduct when it occurred.
Finally, note what the Court did not decide: it did not hold that any offence is proved, and it did not decide the consent question. A discharge refusal is the beginning of a trial, not its end.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the Court hold that the complainant's transgender identity did not prevent a charge under Section 75 of the BNS, even though Section 235 defines “woman” as a female human being?
- What did the Court say about the certificate of identity obtained on 12 February 2026, and why did its timing not defeat the charge?
- How did the 2026 amendment omitting Section 4(2) of the 2019 Act affect the case, and why did the Court apply the law as it stood in October 2025?
