This judgment decides only the NIA's appeal against the grant of bail. It makes no final finding of guilt: the accusations are held prima facie true for the purposes of section 43D(5) of the UAPA, and the trial in Special Case No. 1090 of 2021 continues.
- Case
- National Investigation Agency v. State of Maharashtra and Sachin S/o Hindurao Waze
- Court
- High Court of Bombay
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026:BHC-AS:45323-DB
- Bench
- G. S. Kulkarni; Neela Gokhale
- Case numbers
- Criminal Appeal No. 850 of 2026; Interim Application No. 3559 of 2026; CNR No. HCBM010503882026
- Outcome
- Appeal under section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act 2008 allowed; the Special Judge's order dated 29 September 2026 granting bail is quashed and set aside.
The decision
The Bombay High Court has set aside the bail granted to Sachin Waze, the former assistant police inspector accused in the Antilia explosives and Mansukh Hiran murder case, allowing the National Investigation Agency's appeal. A division bench of Justices G. S. Kulkarni and Dr. Neela Gokhale delivered the 86-page judgment on 5 November 2026.
The court quashed the Special Judge's order dated 29 September 2026, by which Waze's bail application had been allowed, and held that he cannot be enlarged on bail. The interim application in the appeal, which was not pressed, was disposed of.
The case against Waze
Waze, an assistant police inspector in the Crime Intelligence Unit of the Mumbai Crime Branch, is accused no. 1 in Special Case No. 1090 of 2021. He faces trial for offences under sections 120-B, 201, 302, 364 and 403 of the Indian Penal Code, section 25 of the Arms Act 1959, and sections 16, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967. The case concerns three first information reports.
The prosecution's case is that on 25 February 2021 a Mahindra Scorpio containing 20 gelatin sticks and a threat note addressed to the Ambani family was found parked on Carmichael Road, Mumbai, near the family's residence. The note, issued in the name of Jaish-ul-Hind, threatened the family. Waze had two antecedents, the court recorded: a 2004 case at Ghatkopar police station and a 2017 case at Vasai police station, and the present offences were allegedly committed while he was on bail in those cases.
Waze’s first bail application had been rejected on 16 September 2023. He appealed with a delay of 778 days; on 7 August 2026 the High Court closed that application while granting him liberty to file a fresh bail application before the trial court, to be decided on its merits. The Special Judge allowed the fresh application on 29 September 2026, and the NIA appealed under section 21 of the NIA Act.
The question before the court
The appeal turned on section 43D(5) of the UAPA, which bars bail for a person accused of an offence under Chapters IV and VI of the Act if, on a perusal of the case diary or the report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the person is prima facie true. The question was whether the Special Judge had applied that test — and the settled principles for bail in serious offences — when granting bail.
The UAPA bail regime
The court set out the provisions first. Section 15 of the UAPA defines a terrorist act, including an act done with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security or sovereignty of India, or with intent to strike terror in the people or any section of the people, by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances. Section 16 punishes the commission of a terrorist act, section 18 punishes conspiracy and related acts, and section 20 punishes membership of a terrorist gang or organisation.
Section 43D(5) then imposes the gatekeeping test for bail. The court discussed the governing decisions — National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, and others — which require the court to examine the material on record and ask whether there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusation prima facie true, while also weighing the gravity of the offence, the likelihood of tampering with witnesses, and the prospect of a prolonged trial.
Why the bail order could not stand
The court held that, having regard to the totality of the prosecution case, the ingredients of a terrorist act under section 15 of the UAPA appear to be evident in the accusations: prima facie material indicating an act intended to threaten the unity, integrity and security, including the economic security, of the country, and intended to strike terror among a section of the people. A threat of that nature, involving the planting of explosive material accompanied by a threat note issued in the name of Jaish-ul-Hind, was sufficient to attract sections 15 and 16 of the UAPA.
The court then recorded, with what it called profound concern, the manner in which the trial court had dealt with the bail application. It quoted observations from the impugned order — including that the application was decided in the nick of time and that the judge felt honoured to be happily abided by every precedent — and described them as bizarre, strange and abnormal, and as showing an odd approach to a matter as serious as this.
On the merits, the Special Judge had granted bail on reasons including that there was no material that Waze wanted to create terror or extract money, that no statement of the Ambani family showed they were terrorised, and that the gelatin sticks lacked a detonator or fuse. The High Court rejected that reasoning, holding that the finding that framing charges requires a lesser degree of satisfaction than a bail application was absolute legal perversity — particularly as the same judge had found prima facie substance in the accusations and framed charges under the UAPA.
On the material itself, the court held that substantial inculpatory material in the report under section 173 of the Code — including CCTV footage, DVRs and hard drives — overwhelmingly demonstrated reasonable grounds for believing the accusations prima facie true. It also held that, given the position and clout Waze enjoyed, enlarging him on bail was likely to adversely affect the trial, with a reasonable apprehension of tampering with evidence and witnesses.
What happens now
The Special Judge's order of 29 September 2026 stands quashed and set aside, and the NIA's appeal stands allowed. Waze remains in custody pending trial in Special Case No. 1090 of 2021, which the court noted is set to commence.
The court closed by observing that there is no scope for a citizen — and much less a person in uniform, who is supposed to act as a protector of the rights of citizens — to indulge in such activities, and quoted the Supreme Court's observation in Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta that police personnel who operate as criminals are protectors who have become predators.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
Section 43D(5) reverses the ordinary bail inquiry. Instead of asking whether the prosecution has shown a reason to detain, the court must ask whether there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusation prima facie true — and if so, bail is barred. The inquiry is not a mini-trial: the court examines the case diary and the chargesheet, not the final proof.
This judgment is also a lesson in how appellate courts treat bail orders. The High Court did not merely disagree with the Special Judge's conclusion; it held that the judge had applied the wrong test — treating the framing of charges as requiring less satisfaction than bail, and reading the High Court's liberty to file a fresh application as a signal that bail had merit. Finally, note the role of the accused's position: Waze was a serving police officer in the Crime Intelligence Unit, which the court treated as an aggravating consideration for bail, not a reason for trust.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- What is the test in section 43D(5) of the UAPA for refusing bail, and how did the court apply it here?
- Why did the court describe the trial judge's reasoning as perverse, and which of the trial judge's reasons did it single out?
- What material did the court rely on to hold that the accusations against Waze are prima facie true?
