This order decides only bail. It does not decide whether the appellant committed any offence under the UAPA — the charges remain to be tried, and the court's observations are expressly prima facie and at this stage of the proceedings. The court also did not decide the appellant's challenge to the electronic evidence on its merits, and it treated the grounds-of-arrest question as academic because the case began before the decisions in Pankaj Bansal, Shoma Kanti Sen and Prabir Purkayastha.
- Case
- Md. Saddam @ Mohammad Saddam @ Saddam Mallik @ Abdul Mallick v Union of India
- Court
- High Court at Calcutta
- Decision
- Bench
- Arijit Banerjee; Apurba Sinha Ray
- Judgment by
- Apurba Sinha Ray
- Case numbers
- CRA (DB) 324 of 2025
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed; prayer for bail rejected under section 43D(5) of the UAPA. The appellant remains in custody and the trial continues.
Bail refused: the accusations appear prima facie true
The High Court at Calcutta has refused bail to Md. Saddam, an accused in a National Investigation Agency case who the prosecution says recruited and radicalised young men for ISIS, holding that the accusations appear prima facie true at this stage.
A Division Bench of Mr Justice Arijit Banerjee and Mr Justice Apurba Sinha Ray dismissed his appeal, CRA (DB) 324 of 2025, on 13 November 2026. Mr Justice Ray held that the materials showed overt acts beyond mere possession of literature, and that the case had not reached the "melting point" at which the rigours of section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, give way to the right to a speedy trial.
Arrested in January 2023; charge framed in August 2025
The appellant was arrested on 6 January 2023 and, by the date of judgment, had been in custody for more than three years and ten months. The chargesheet was filed on 4 July 2023, and the trial court framed the charge on 14 August 2025.
He then applied for discharge, which the trial judge rejected, and the present appeal followed. His counsel submitted that of the 52 charge-sheet witnesses, only three had been examined. The Court recorded, however, that several witnesses had been examined and their cross-examination deferred by the applicant himself under section 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The appellant's case: mere possession, no overt act, long delay
Counsel for the appellant submitted that the entire allegation was that he was an ISIS sympathiser who had indoctrinated several young men, and that images and videos with incriminating material had been found in mobile phones and laptops. Mere possession of such material, he argued, does not constitute any offence, and the same material had been recovered from Farhan, cited as a prosecution witness rather than made an accused.
He relied on Thwaha Fasal v Union of India, where the Supreme Court held that mere association with, or mere support for, a terrorist organisation is not enough to attract sections 38 and 39 of the UAPA: the association and support must be with the intention of furthering the organisation's activities, inferred only from overt acts borne out by the charge-sheet. He relied likewise on Vernon v State of Maharashtra, where merely holding literature was held not by itself to attract section 15(1)(b) of the Act.
He further submitted that there was no direct overt act linking him with ISIS, that the WhatsApp and Telegram chats were unsupported by any material from those platforms, and that the electronic evidence lacked a strict chain of custody. On delay, he invoked Union of India v K.A. Najeeb, and pointed to the wording of section 43D(5), which bars bail only where the court is of the opinion that the accusation is prima facie true — less stringent, he said, than section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act or section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act.
The NIA's case: an active operator, not a passive sympathiser
The NIA objected that the appellant was not a passive sympathiser but an active ISIS operator: recruiting and radicalising Muslim youths, disseminating ISIS propaganda, and administering clandestine Telegram groups for sending recruits to Afghanistan and Khorasan for terrorist training, and discussing target killings and attacks on identified persons and institutions.
The extraction report, the NIA submitted, showed the appellant in communication with entities operating from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and elsewhere, and showed him not merely in possession of violent propaganda videos generated by ISIS but actively circulating them among other Muslim youths, using a virtual phone number. The investigation had identified one Amina Bint Munnavar, residing in Singapore, as a key radicaliser and administrator of ISIS-linked groups. That evidence, the NIA said, was corroborated by the statement of the prosecution witness Farhan Javed.
Overt acts, not mere possession: why Vernon did not apply
The Court stated its task under section 43D(5) plainly: to find out whether the materials were sufficient to hold at this stage that the accusation against him was prima facie true or not.
The extraction reports showed messages exchanged on Telegram through virtual numbers with persons residing outside India, with talks of recruiting Indian youth abroad for militant purposes. There were materials, the Court said, to show that the applicant took an active part in collecting, organising or instigating youth who would take part in hijarat and jihad, and that he collected youth for isthihad, a suicide squad. "These materials clearly distinguish this case from Vernon," the Court held: "the case at hand is not mere possession of literature." The overt acts also satisfied the condition in Thwaha Fasal.
Apart from the chats, the Court recorded a large number of videos and pictures showing killings and the training of militants, and that some videos showed planning to kill the Prime Minister of India and the President of the United States. The Court also rejected the appellant's claim of parity with Farhan: his statement under section 164 of the Code showed he had come to Howrah for his education and was sent the material by the applicant, who told him it was confidential. The applicant and Farhan "do not stand on the same footing".
No laches by the prosecution; the melting point not reached
The Court then addressed delay through K.A. Najeeb, quoting paragraph 17 of that judgment: the rigours of section 43D(5) "will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence".
On the facts, it found no intentional laches on the part of the prosecution: cross-examination had been deferred by the applicant himself, the discharge application had consumed much time, and 52 witnesses was not excessive for the case.
The Court also treated the grounds-of-arrest objection as academic, since the case had begun on 6 January 2023, before the decisions in Pankaj Bansal, Shoma Kanti Sen and Prabir Purkayastha. At this stage, it recalled, it could not evaluate the evidence threadbarely or hold a mini-trial. The case, it concluded, "has not reached the melting point as indicated in K.A. Najeeb's case".
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students: the section 43D(5) test and the melting point
Section 43D(5) sets a distinctive bail test. Unlike section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act or section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, it does not require the court to be satisfied that the accused is not guilty and will not reoffend. It bars bail where the court is of the opinion, on the case diary or the report under section 173 of the Code, that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true — a test about the materials at this stage, not a finding of guilt.
The judgment is also a worked example of the Thwaha Fasal and Vernon line. Mere association with, or support for, a terrorist organisation, and mere possession of its literature, do not by themselves show the intention to further its activities. What moved this case across the line was evidence of overt acts: recruitment talks, circulation of propaganda, and instigation of others.
Note, finally, how the Court used Najeeb. The "melting point" is not reached merely because custody has been long: the Court asked who caused the delay and whether the trial was moving. But the Court's observations remain prima facie only, and the charges are still to be tried.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- What is the test under section 43D(5) of the UAPA at the bail stage, and how does the Court describe its task in paragraph 13?
- Why did the Court hold that this case was not one of mere possession of literature, and how did it distinguish Vernon and apply Thwaha Fasal?
- What is the 'melting point' in K.A. Najeeb, and why did the Court hold it had not been reached here?