This order does NOT decide whether the applicant is guilty of any offence, and its observations are only for disposing of the bail application; the Court expressly said nothing in it is an expression of opinion on the merits. It does not preclude the applicant from surrendering before the competent court and seeking regular bail, which must be decided in accordance with law and uninfluenced by these observations. The writ petition W.P.(Crl) 2484/2026 and its interim-protection application, listed on 17 November 2026, fall to be considered independently. The complainant's identity must not be disclosed in any proceedings or report arising from the judgment, and this report does not name her.
- Case
- Akshay Aditya v. State of NCT of Delhi and Anr.
- Court
- High Court of Delhi
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026:DHC:9608
- Bench
- Sachin Datta
- Judgment by
- Sachin Datta
- Case numbers
- BAIL APPLN. 3355/2026
- Outcome
- Anticipatory bail application dismissed. The interim protection granted on 17 August 2026 stands vacated and the State's application for vacation is allowed. The applicant may surrender and seek regular bail.
Delhi High Court dismisses anticipatory bail and vacates interim protection
The Delhi High Court has dismissed Akshay Aditya's anticipatory bail application under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in FIR No. 0164/2026 dated 29 July 2026 (Police Station Hazrat Nizamuddin), and vacated the interim protection against coercive steps granted on 17 August 2026.
Justice Sachin Datta held the case was not an “exceptional case” for anticipatory bail: the investigation is incomplete, the agency has shown a specific need for custodial interrogation, and the defence is for trial.
The complaint and the road to the High Court
The complainant, an adult, states that the applicant — a postgraduate surgery student at Patna Medical College Hospital — contacted her through Instagram in early November 2025 and repeatedly represented that he would marry her. The FIR invokes Sections 64(1), 69, 351(2) and 115(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 64(2)(m) (repeated rape of the same woman) has since been added on material collected during investigation.
The complaint alleges forcible sexual intercourse on 21 December 2025, 8 March 2026 and 3 June 2026, and an attempted act of the same kind on 11 April 2026, with threats, including of self-harm, to dissuade disclosure. Her Section 183 BNSS statement before a Magistrate supports the complaint version, per the State's status report dated 14 September 2026.
Taken into custody at Patna on 30 July 2026, the applicant was released the same day after the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, declined transit remand on procedural grounds, on a Rs. 10,000 personal bond with an undertaking to join investigation within 30 days. The Additional Sessions Judge, Saket, dismissed his anticipatory bail plea on 10 August 2026; the High Court granted interim protection on 17 August 2026, directed him to join investigation with all his devices, and the State later sought its vacation after he had joined investigation on several dates in August and September 2026.
Consensual relationship, says the applicant; force on specific dates, says the State
The applicant says the relationship was consensual and known to both families, that the complainant booked hotel rooms herself and travelled to Patna twice, and that in April 2026 she sent a “three options” message (six months exclusive, marriage within six months, or permanence without marriage). He controverts forcible intercourse, says marriage was always insisted on only with both families' consent, and says a good-faith promise that could not be fulfilled is not a false promise. His earlier phone, he says, was snatched on 4 June 2026, and he has since produced his devices and credentials.
The State and the complainant answer that this is forcible intercourse on identified occasions, supported by the Section 183 statement, by call-detail, location and hotel records of his presence on the material dates, and by his own messages, said to be virtually admissions, speaking of having “ruined it for us” and “destroyed a family”. The vanished handset and deleted Instagram communications, they say, require custodial interrogation. The applicant further calls the FIR a counter-blast to his Patna complaints of extortion, blackmail and coercion.
Anticipatory bail is exceptional; cooperation alone does not earn it
Anticipatory bail, the Court began, is an extraordinary privilege granted only in exceptional cases (Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar; Nikita Jagganath Shetty v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1489; P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement). Applying Sumitha Pradeep v. Arun Kumar C.K. and P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2025 INSC 725), it held that custodial interrogation is only one relevant aspect, that the prima facie case, the nature of the offence and the punishment must be considered first, and that joining investigation under an interim order does not foreclose a later custodial need.
Force, not false promise, is the core allegation
What weighed heavily, the Court said, was that the FIR alleges forcible intercourse against the complainant's will on identified occasions, coupled with an attempted act on 11 April 2026 — “not merely of sexual intercourse induced by a false promise of marriage”. Where consent itself is denied on identified occasions, the false-promise question does not arise: Section 69, punishing intercourse by deceitful means or on an unmeant promise of marriage, operates only where the intercourse does not amount to rape, so invoking it alongside Section 64 does not dilute the forcible-intercourse allegation.
Even accepting a genuine promise and a consensual relationship would not answer the force allegation, reiterated in the Section 183 statement: “consent to a relationship is not tantamount to consent to each act within it.” Explanation 2 to Section 63 defines consent as an unequivocal voluntary agreement, communicated verbally or non-verbally, to participate in the specific sexual act — and provides that non-resistance to penetration alone is not consent.
Section 64(1) carries rigorous imprisonment of not less than ten years extending to life, and Section 64(2)(m) the same minimum; Section 120 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam presumes absence of consent where intercourse is proved and the woman states she did not consent. His presence on the material dates is undisputed (save the 8 March 2026 premises) and is prima facie corroborated by the records, and his messages are prima facie consistent with her account; the bookings, travel and “three options” message at best show a relationship, which is not in dispute, and do not answer the force allegation.
The missing phone, and why this was not an exceptional case
Most significantly, crucial evidence on the applicant's side had become unavailable. He had himself averred before the Sessions Court that his phone held the entire electronic record of the relationship; said to have been snatched at knife-point at about 11 pm on 4 June 2026 — yet no police complaint about the snatching is on record, and the only document is his own hospital's slip dated 5 June 2026 at 10:45 am, recording an “alleged” assault the previous night, patient “Referred by: Self”. “The entire version of the applicant regarding the loss of his handset does not inspire credibility, to say the least,” the Court said.
The deleted Instagram communications likewise require forensic examination of their timing, extent and recoverability. An applicant whose device vanished on the very day he asserted it held the whole record, the Court concluded, “does not qualify as an exceptional case” for pre-arrest protection. The interim protection was vacated, the bail application dismissed, and the 17 November 2026 date in this application cancelled — while he remains free to surrender and seek regular bail, and W.P.(Crl) 2484/2026 falls to be considered independently.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students: why Section 69 does not swallow Section 64
The holding to carry away is structural. Section 69 is residual by its own words — “such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape” — so it cannot re-characterise a forcible-intercourse allegation as a false-promise case. Once the complaint alleges force on identified dates, the false-promise inquiry (false when made, in bad faith, with no intention to adhere, and causally linked to consent?) simply does not arise. That is also why the relationship evidence cut so little ice: bookings and travel prove a relationship, not consent to any particular act.
The bail reasoning repays study too: anticipatory bail asks whether this is an exceptional case, not whether the applicant has cooperated so far, and cooperation under an interim order cannot freeze later needs — here, confrontation over a vanished handset and deleted messages. Note also the Court's self-restraint: no mini-trial on the chats, regular bail preserved uninfluenced by its observations, and the pending writ petition fenced off. A bail order that decides only bail is doing its job.
- High Court of Delhi: Akshay Aditya v. State of NCT of Delhi and Anr., BAIL APPLN. 3355/2026, 30 October 2026 (official judgment)paras 38, 41, 44-47, 52, 55, 61-62, 64, 67, 70, 72; PDF pp. 21, 23-24, 26-27, 30-32
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the Court hold that Section 69 BNS, as a residual provision, did not weaken the Section 64 allegation here?
- Why does consent to a relationship not answer an allegation of force on a specific occasion, under Explanation 2 to Section 63 BNS?
- Why did the applicant's cooperation with investigation, including joining on several dates, not by itself entitle him to anticipatory bail?
