What this judgment does NOT decide: it does not hold that any appellant personally inflicted the fatal head injuries, and it does not disturb the trial court's acquittal of the two other accused, Krishan Kant and Rahul Bhardwaj. It decides only that the conviction and sentence of these five appellants stand on the evidence of their membership of the unlawful assembly and its common object. It is not an acquittal or conviction of any other person in the 2020 North-East Delhi violence.
- Case
- Aman Kashyap v. State of NCT of Delhi
- Court
- Delhi High Court
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026:DHC:9442
- Bench
- Madhu Jain
- Judgment by
- Madhu Jain
- Case numbers
- CRL.A. 133 of 2025; CRL.A. 180 of 2025; CRL.A. 181 of 2025; CRL.A. 185 of 2025; CRL.A. 289 of 2025
- Outcome
- Final judgment dismissing five criminal appeals (CRL.A. 133/2025, 180/2025, 181/2025, 185/2025 and 289/2025) and upholding the trial court's judgment of conviction dated 30 November 2024 and order on sentence dated 13 January 2025 insofar as the five appellants are concerned.
The decision
The Delhi High Court has dismissed the appeals of five men convicted over the death of a 22-year-old during the communal violence in North-East Delhi on 25 February 2020, leaving their convictions and sentences intact. Justice Madhu Jain, sitting singly, pronounced the judgment on 27 October 2026, after reserving it on 9 October 2026.
The appeals — CRL.A. 133/2025 by Aman Kashyap, CRL.A. 180/2025 by Devinder Kumar, CRL.A. 181/2025 by Pradeep Rai, CRL.A. 185/2025 by Ashish @ Goli and CRL.A. 289/2025 by Arun Kumar — all challenged the same trial-court judgment. The Court dismissed all five and upheld the common judgment of conviction dated 30 November 2024 and the order on sentence dated 13 January 2025, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, in Sessions Case No. 199/2021, arising out of FIR No. 87/2020 registered at Police Station Dayalpur, insofar as the five appellants are concerned.
What happened on 25 February 2020
The case arises out of an incident on 25 February 2020, during the communal violence in North-East Delhi. According to the prosecution narrative recorded in the judgment, a young man was found injured near Gali No. 3, Brijpuri, in the vicinity of Peer Baba Mazar, Chand Bagh, and was later identified as Monish, aged about 22 years. He died in hospital.
The matter first came to police notice through information received from GTB Hospital on 25 February 2020. On 1 March 2020, ASI Vijyant Kumar prepared a rukka on the basis of which FIR No. 87/2020 was registered at Police Station Dayalpur. During the investigation, the police examined the duty roster and deployment records of personnel at Brijpuri T-Point on 25 February 2020, obtained call records, and recorded statements of police witnesses and of persons who had seen the pursuit and assault.
The trial: conviction, acquittals and sentence
Charges were framed on 31 July 2021, and the prosecution examined 18 witnesses. On 30 November 2024, the trial court convicted the five appellants for offences punishable under Sections 148 and 304 Part I read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Two other accused persons, Krishan Kant and Rahul Bhardwaj, were acquitted of the charges against them.
By the order on sentence dated 13 January 2025, the appellants were sentenced to simple imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 148 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for seven years, along with a fine of Rs. 30,000, for the offence under Section 304 Part I IPC. Both substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently, and in default of payment of the fine the appellants were directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two years. The appellants challenged both the conviction and the sentence in the present batch of appeals.
The appeals: grounds and the State's answer
The appellants attacked the prosecution case on several fronts. They contended that the incident was said to have occurred on 25 February 2020 whereas the FIR was registered only on 1 March 2020, and that this delay mattered because the prosecution claimed several police officials had personally witnessed the occurrence. They also pointed to inconsistencies in the eyewitness accounts, to delays in recording the statements of police witnesses, and to the absence of a test identification parade.
They further contended that the prosecution had failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellants shared the common object required for liability under Section 149 IPC, arguing that mere alleged presence in a large gathering could not supply that element. The State opposed the appeals, relying in particular on the beat constable of the locality, PW-10 Ct. Piyush, who was said to have known the appellants before the incident and to have identified them in court.
Why the appeals failed: more than mere presence
The Court rejected the mere-presence argument on the facts. It held that the evidence established more than the mere presence of the appellants in a crowd: PW-10 had identified all five appellants at the forefront of the armed mob, exhorting others to assault the deceased, and the deceased had been pursued, surrounded and assaulted even after he had fallen near the police barricades. The conduct attributed to the appellants, the weapons carried by members of the mob and the continued assault provided the factual basis for concluding that the assembly had an unlawful common object of assaulting the deceased and causing bodily harm to him.
On Section 149 IPC, the Court held that once membership of the unlawful assembly and the requisite common object or knowledge are established, the absence of proof identifying the individual author of the fatal injuries does not, by itself, absolve the members of liability. The offence must still be shown to have been committed in prosecution of the common object, or to have been one which its members knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. The Court added that the conclusion must rest on the proved circumstances — the weapons, the exhortations and the manner of assault — rather than upon the mere occurrence of death.
On the mental element for Section 304 Part I, the Court explained that Part I applies where the act causing death is accompanied by the intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, whereas Part II applies where there is knowledge that death is likely to result, without that intention. The manner of assault described in the evidence — pursuit by an armed mob, assault after the deceased fell near the barricades, and repeated blows including injuries to the head — was capable of bearing on the inference of an intention to cause bodily injuries likely to result in death.
What happens next
With the appeals dismissed, the convictions and the sentences imposed on 13 January 2025 stand for all five appellants. Pending applications in the appeals stand disposed of in accordance with the judgment, and a copy of the judgment, along with the trial court record, is to be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent and to the trial court for information and necessary compliance.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
This judgment is a compact lesson in how Section 149 IPC works in mob-violence cases. Section 149 does not punish mere presence: the Court insists on a clear finding of a common object that is unlawful, or of knowledge that the offence was likely in prosecution of that object. What did the work here was not the crowd itself but the proved circumstances around it — the appellants at the forefront, the exhortations, the weapons and the continued assault after the victim fell.
Note also what the Court did not require: identification of the single hand that struck the fatal blow. Once assembly membership and common object are proved, Section 149 supplies the bridge to liability for the offence committed in prosecution of that object. And note the Part I/Part II distinction the Court draws for Section 304: intention to cause death or injury likely to cause death points to Part I, while mere knowledge that death is likely points to Part II. The repeated blows and head injuries were described by the Court as capable of bearing on the inference of a Part I intention, not as a substitute for proving it.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the High Court hold that the appellants' presence in the mob was more than mere presence, and which witness's evidence supplied that finding?
- Under Section 149 IPC, why does the prosecution not need to prove which member of the assembly inflicted the fatal injuries, and what must it prove instead?
- What distinguishes Section 304 Part I from Part II IPC in the Court's discussion, and why did Part I apply here?
