This is a bare interim order in pending PILs. It grants no relief, decides nothing on the merits of the petitioners' apprehensions, identifies Respondent No. 6 only by that designation, and describes the apprehended disturbance only as the 'conduct' and 'activity' of that respondent. The recorded assurance is the Additional Solicitor General's statement, not a direction of the Court. Everything substantive remains pending for the 3 November 2026 hearing.
- Case
- Nand Kishore Chugh & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.; Anil Kumar Gupta v. Union of India & Ors.
- Court
- High Court of Delhi
- Decision
- Bench
- Nitin Wasudeo Sambre, ACJ; Sanjay Sharma
- Case numbers
- W.P.(C) 15495/2026; W.P.(C) 15500/2026
- Outcome
- Interim order dated 15-10-2026 in W.P.(C) Nos. 15495/2026 and 15500/2026 (PILs): the Additional Solicitor General's assurance of regulation and control taken on record; petitions listed for further hearing on 03.11.2026.
Assurance taken on record; no relief granted; petitions listed for 3 November
On 15 October 2026, a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi comprising Acting Chief Justice Nitin Wasudeo Sambre and Justice Sanjay Sharma passed an interim order in two Public Interest Litigations - W.P.(C) 15495 of 2026, filed by Sh. Nand Kishore Chugh and another, and W.P.(C) 15500 of 2026, filed by Sh. Anil Kumar Gupta - both arrayed against the Union of India and others. The order records that the petitioner has an apprehension that the conduct of Respondent No. 6 in W.P.(C) 15500 of 2026 is likely to disturb their business activity at Connaught Place area in Delhi.
The Court granted no relief in the order. When confronted, the Additional Solicitor General appearing for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in W.P.(C) 15500 of 2026 assured the Court that the apprehension of the petitioner would be taken care of, as the respondents had taken enough steps in the matter to regulate and control the activity of Respondent No. 6. The Court took the assurance on record and listed the petitions for further hearing on 3 November 2026.
The petitions and the procedure: email service recorded, digitally signed order
The two petitions share the same respondent set - the Union of India and others - and were heard together. The cause titles show W.P.(C) 15495 of 2026 with CM APPL. 72636 of 2026, and W.P.(C) 15500 of 2026 with CM APPL. 72748 of 2026. The petitioners were represented by senior counsel; the Union was represented by the Additional Solicitor General Mr. Chetan Sharma with Central Government Standing Counsel.
The order records one procedural step expressly: Respondent No. 6 in W.P.(C) 15500 of 2026 is already served through email. Every page carries the footer that this is a digitally signed order whose authenticity can be re-verified from the Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code.
BANTHRY ANALYSISAnalysis: what a recorded assurance is - and is not
A recorded assurance is one of the Court's standard interim devices: the executive tells the Court what it will do, and the Court puts that statement on the record instead of issuing a direction. The practical effect is real - a statement made to the Court can later be tested, and a breach can invite contempt - but it is not an order to the executive. The Court has not directed the respondents to do anything; it has recorded what the Additional Solicitor General said the respondents have already done and will take care of.
The distinction is the whole content of this order. Its operative text contains no direction, no restraint, and no finding - only the recorded apprehension, the service note, the assurance, and the listing. The petitions remain alive for 3 November, when the Court can revisit the matter with the respondents' position on record.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students: reading a bare order and the email-service note
This order is a good specimen of a bare interim order: four short paragraphs, and everything a reader can responsibly say about the dispute must come from those paragraphs. The order does not identify Respondent No. 6 beyond the designation, and it describes the apprehended disturbance only as 'conduct' and 'activity'. A reader who fills those blanks from outside the order is no longer reading the order - the discipline of a bare order is to say what it says and mark the rest as not on the record.
The Court's express recording of email service on Respondent No. 6 is the other teaching point. In urgent PILs, service is often the bottleneck: a court cannot pass even interim directions against a respondent without notice. Recording email service closes that gap on the record, so the 3 November hearing can proceed against that respondent without a service objection.
What the order does not decide
The order decides nothing on whether the petitioners' apprehension was well-founded, nothing on the merits of either petition, nothing on the conduct or identity of Respondent No. 6, and nothing on what the petitioners had asked for - the contents of the two civil miscellaneous applications are not set out in the order. It contains no assessment of the steps the respondents say they have taken.
The recorded assurance is procedural: it is the Additional Solicitor General's statement, not an adjudicated direction of the Court. Everything substantive - the petitions, the interim applications, and any relief - remains pending for the 3 November hearing.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- The order records the Additional Solicitor General's assurance instead of granting any relief. What is the legal difference between a recorded assurance and an interim direction of the court, and why does that distinction matter for what follows if the assurance is breached?
- The order expressly records that Respondent No. 6 in W.P.(C) 15500/2026 'is already served through E-mail'. What procedural function does recording service in an interim order perform, and what difficulty would the court have faced at the 3 November hearing if service were incomplete?
- The order refers to the apprehended disturbance only as the 'conduct' and 'activity' of Respondent No. 6, without identifying that respondent or describing the conduct. As a reader of a bare order, what are the limits on what you can responsibly say about the underlying dispute?
