This judgment does not decide any case against the other constables named in the allegations, who were not before the Court, and does not lay down any new law on proof of bribery — it applies the Constitution Bench decision in Neeraj Dutta to the facts of this trap.
- Case
- Naresh Pal v. State
- Court
- High Court of Delhi
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026:DHC:9842
- Bench
- Vimal Kumar Yadav
- Judgment by
- Vimal Kumar Yadav
- Case numbers
- CRL.A. 1010/2008
- Outcome
- Criminal appeal against a 2008 conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 dismissed; conviction upheld and appellant directed to surrender forthwith.
Conviction upheld; constable to surrender
The Delhi High Court has upheld the conviction of a beat constable for demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹1,000, and dismissed his appeal against the trial court's 2008 judgment. Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav held on 4 November 2026 that the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Naresh Pal had been sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹10,000 for each offence. The Court directed him to surrender forthwith, with the benefit of set-off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as already granted.
A ₹5,000 demand, a ₹1,000 trap, and a hostile complainant
The complainant, Lakhan Singh, ran a lemon soda water factory, M/s R.K. Soft Drinks, at Raghubir Nagar, Delhi. The prosecution's case was that the appellant, then a beat constable, with constables Amit and Dharambir, harassed him over a licence not in his possession and demanded ₹5,000 to let him continue trading. On 23 March 2004 the demand was repeated; when the complainant said he could not arrange the whole amount, it was agreed that ₹1,000 would be paid first.
The complainant then approached the Anti-Corruption Branch. Two ₹500 notes were treated with phenolphthalein powder, their serial numbers noted, and the complainant was told to hand them over on demand. With Radha Kishan as shadow witness, the raiding party apprehended the appellant on the pre-arranged signal; the notes were recovered from the left pocket of his shirt, and the washes of his hands and pocket turned pink.
The prosecution examined thirteen witnesses. At trial, however, the complainant did not support the prosecution on material aspects: he said the appellant had refused the money and that he himself had inserted the treated notes into the appellant's shirt pocket. He was declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution, but still did not support the material allegations.
The appellant's three challenges
The appellant challenged the conviction principally on the ground that the prosecution had failed to establish demand and voluntary acceptance, arguing that the complaint could not be substantive evidence of demand once its maker did not affirm it in court.
He also attacked the reliance on the shadow witness, Radha Kishan. Although Kishan saw the complainant hand something to the appellant, who accepted it with his right hand and kept it in the pocket of his pants, the notes were recovered from the left pocket of the appellant's shirt. The appellant submitted that this was a material inconsistency about how the gratification was accepted and retained, not a minor discrepancy.
The appellant further objected to questions 13 and 15 put to him in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which proceeded on the premise that he had demanded and accepted illegal gratification, and to the absence of any pre-trap verification of the complaint. He also offered an explanation for his presence at the spot — a telephone call about a dispute at the complainant's jhuggi — supported by Constable Pratap Singh, a defence witness, though neither of them had made any Daily Diary entry about the call.
Neeraj Dutta: demand and acceptance may be proved circumstantially
The Court set out the legal position from the Constitution Bench decision in Neeraj Dutta, which clarified that the prosecution must prove the facts constituting the offence, and that those facts may be established either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. The fact that the complainant does not support the prosecution, or is unavailable as a witness, does not by itself bring the prosecution to an end; the Court must examine whether the remaining evidence establishes the relevant facts beyond reasonable doubt.
Neeraj Dutta also requires a distinction between the offence under Section 7 and the offence of obtaining illegal gratification under the then applicable Section 13(1)(d). Where a public servant demands illegal gratification and obtains it, the prosecution must establish both demand and obtainment. But where the bribe-giver independently offers illegal gratification and the public servant knowingly and voluntarily accepts it, the absence of a prior demand does not by itself defeat the charge under Section 7. In either situation, mere recovery of currency notes is not sufficient, and the Section 20 presumption cannot convert an uncertain transaction into proof of knowing and voluntary acceptance.
The circumstances, taken together, proved the case
Applying those principles, the Court held that the shadow witness's testimony could not be excluded from the assessment of demand merely because he had not heard the alleged demand. His evidence about the actual transaction, the manner of transfer, the appellant's acceptance, and his denial of the suggestion that the notes had been forcibly inserted into the appellant's pocket, had to be considered together with the other proved circumstances.
The Court also dealt with the alleged deficiencies one by one: the failure to verify the complaint before the trap bore on the investigation's reliability but did not require proved events to be disregarded; the Section 313 questions were not substantive evidence and their formulation did not vitiate the proceedings; and the telephone-call explanation for the appellant's presence was weakened by the absence of any Daily Diary entry about the call or his departure from the police station.
On the whole, the Court concluded that the shadow witness's account of the voluntary transfer, his rejection of the forcible-insertion suggestion, and the corroborative evidence of recovery and the chemical washes, considered with the sequence of complaint and trap, supported the prosecution's case that the appellant obtained the illegal gratification in the course of the raid. The trial court's findings therefore could not be set aside merely because the complainant turned hostile or because the shadow witness had not testified to the precise words of the demand.
BANTHRY ANALYSISWhat this judgment does — and does not — change
This judgment applies settled law rather than making new law. Its value is in showing how Neeraj Dutta works on difficult facts: a resiling complainant, a shadow witness whose account differs on details, and a recovery that alone proves little. The Court's answer is cumulative assessment — the transaction as seen by the shadow witness, the recovery and the pink washes together prove knowing and voluntary acceptance beyond reasonable doubt.
The judgment also illustrates the limits of the defence's tools. A hostile complainant removes the prosecution's best witness but does not end the case; an inconsistency about which pocket held the notes goes to the weight of the shadow witness's evidence, not to its admissibility; and a Section 313 objection fails where the conviction rests on the evidence as a whole. For prosecutors, the lesson is to build the trap record — pre-raid report, serial numbers, shadow witness, washes — so that the case survives the complainant.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
Three distinctions here are examination-worthy. First, under Neeraj Dutta, demand must be proved, but it may be proved by circumstantial evidence — the absence of direct testimony to the demand is not fatal. Second, mere recovery of tainted money is never enough by itself; the prosecution must prove demand and voluntary acceptance, and the Section 20 presumption only operates after the foundational facts are proved. Third, Section 7 (accepting gratification) and Section 13(1)(d) (obtaining a pecuniary advantage by corrupt means or abuse of position) are distinct offences with distinct ingredients, and the Court kept them separate even while upholding both convictions on the same facts.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the complainant turning hostile not defeat the prosecution's case, and what did Neeraj Dutta require the Court to examine instead?
- What was the difference between the offences under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act that the Court drew from Neeraj Dutta?
- Which items of circumstantial evidence, taken together, did the Court treat as proving that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily accepted the money?
