This judgment does NOT decide the merits of the challenge to the 29 April 2013 consent decree, the allegations of fraud and collusion, or who ultimately owns the subject land. Those questions remain open in the main appeal before the Gujarat High Court, which the Supreme Court asked to be heard and disposed of within three months.
- Case
- Girishbhai Natwarlal Patel v. Gautam Punjabhai Palkhiwala (Dead) by LRs & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 1177
- Bench
- J.B. Pardiwala; K. Vinod Chandran
- Judgment by
- J.B. Pardiwala
- Case numbers
- Civil Appeal Nos. 14017-14018 of 2026
- Outcome
- Civil appeals dismissed. The Gujarat High Court's injunction, leave to appeal, and delay condonation stand; the main appeal against the consent decree remains to be heard on its merits.
Appeals dismissed, Gujarat High Court orders left intact
The Supreme Court has dismissed the appeals filed by Girishbhai Natwarlal Patel against two orders of the Gujarat High Court, leaving intact the interim protection, the leave to appeal, and the condonation of an eleven-year delay.
Authored by Justice J.B. Pardiwala for a bench also comprising Justice K. Vinod Chandran, the judgment holds that a person who was neither a party to the suit nor a party to the compromise behind a consent decree is not barred by Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Order XXIII Rules 3 and 3A, from seeking leave to appeal against that decree. The estoppel created by those provisions, the Court says, operates only between the parties to the compromise.
A 2012 suit, a 2013 consent decree, and a 2022 sale deed
The dispute concerns land that was the subject of a suit for specific performance instituted in 2012 on the basis of an agreement to sell dated 11 September 1996. That suit ended in a consent decree dated 29 April 2013 in favour of Geetagram Society. The decree was not executed until 2020, and a sale deed in favour of Patel was executed on 18 June 2022, with Geetagram Society joining as a confirming party.
Respondent Nos. 1 to 9, who were not parties to the suit or to the compromise, approached the Gujarat High Court seeking leave to appeal against the consent decree, saying it prejudicially affected an independent interest they claimed in the land. On 2 April 2024 the High Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining Patel, and anyone acting on his behalf, from entering upon the land or selling, transferring, mortgaging, leasing or otherwise dealing with it, to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings.
Patel was not a party when that ex parte order was passed, but the registry issued him a writ of the leave application, and the matter was then heard between the parties with the interim relief continued. On 14 August 2024 the High Court confirmed the interim relief, condoned the delay of about eleven years, and granted Respondent Nos. 1 to 9 leave to appeal. Patel challenged both orders before the Supreme Court.
Three questions, and a deliberately narrow scope
The Court framed three questions: whether the High Court erred in granting the 2 April 2024 injunction and continuing it on 14 August 2024; whether leave to appeal could be granted to applicants who were not parties to the original suit; and whether condonation of the eleven-year delay was justified.
At the outset the Court confined its inquiry to the legality of the leave order, the legality of the condonation order, and the sustainability of the ad interim injunction. It did not extend to the merits of the appeal against the consent decree, so its examination of the fraud and collusion allegations, and of the circumstances in which the consent decree was passed, is not a conclusive finding on the merits.
The bar on appeals against consent decrees binds only the parties who compromised
Patel argued that Section 96(3) bars an appeal against a consent decree, and that Order XXIII Rules 3 and 3A shut out a stranger's challenge. The Court rejected that reading. Its earlier observations that no appeal lies against a consent decree, it said, were made about the remedies of parties to a consent decree seeking to avoid it, and must be read with that qualifier, and Respondent Nos. 1 to 9, not being parties to the consent decree, could not be brought within Section 96 read with Order XXIII Rule 3 or Rule 3A.
The Court distinguished Triloki Nath Singh, where the appellant had acquired the property during the pendency of the title suit and traced his title through a party to the suit, so he was bound by the compromise. Respondent Nos. 1 to 9, by contrast, were complete strangers to the consent decree who did not trace their claim through any party to it, and there was no pending litigation between them and the parties to the suit.
The governing rule follows: a person who was neither a party to the original proceedings nor a party to the compromise cannot, merely because a decree was passed with others' consent, be deemed to have consented to it or be precluded from asserting an independent right allegedly prejudiced by it. A stranger to a compromise decree is not barred under Section 96(3) read with Order XXIII Rules 3 and 3A, whose scope is limited to the parties to the compromise.
Leave is not automatic: prejudice must be shown prima facie
Non-party status does not confer an unrestricted right of appeal, the Court stressed. Such a person must prima facie show that the decree prejudicially affects his rights or interests, and must obtain leave under the settled principles for non-party appeals. Whether a person is adversely affected is a question of fact in each case.
On that test, the material relied on by Respondent Nos. 1 to 9 could not be dismissed at this stage as disclosing no more than an imaginary or remote interest, and leave was justified — a conclusion going only to standing, not to the merits or the fraud and collusion allegations.
The injunction's continuation was not an automatic perpetuation of the ex parte order: Patel had been heard and the rival submissions considered, and interim protection was continued to preserve the subject matter pending adjudication.
On delay, merely counting eleven years from the 29 April 2013 decree could not answer the question, because Respondent Nos. 1 to 9 were neither parties nor participants in the compromise, so knowledge could not be assumed from the decree's date. They said they learnt of the revenue-record alteration in or around August 2023 and relied on Right to Information material, including a response of 21 March 2024. That explained the earlier inaction, so condonation was no error — and condonation decides no merits; it merely permits examination in appeal.
Operative outcome and what happens next
The Court held that the injunction of 2 April 2024, continued on 14 August 2024, does not warrant interference; that the High Court was justified in granting leave to Respondent Nos. 1 to 9; and that it committed no error in condoning the delay. It concluded that no error, still less an error of law, was committed in passing either impugned order, and dismissed the appeals.
The Court requested the Gujarat High Court to hear and dispose of the main appeal within three months from 30 October 2026, and directed its registry to forward a copy of the judgment to that Court.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
This judgment corrects a common shorthand. Section 96(3) is often quoted as if no appeal can ever be filed against a consent decree. Girishbhai shows the bar is personal, not universal: it estops the parties who actually compromised, and does not silence a stranger whose independent right is said to be prejudiced. The stranger's route is gated twice: by leave, which requires a prima facie showing of a legally cognisable interest prejudicially affected, and by limitation, where knowledge is counted from when the non-party actually learnt, or could reasonably have learnt, of the decree and the prejudice, not mechanically from the decree's date.
Note what the Court refused to do: it upheld interim protection, leave and condonation without deciding whether the consent decree was obtained by fraud or collusion, or who ultimately owns the land. Such procedural victories open the door to an appeal, not its result.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why does Section 96(3) CPC, read with Order XXIII Rules 3 and 3A, not bar Respondent Nos. 1 to 9 from seeking leave to appeal?
- What two things must a non-party prima facie demonstrate before leave to appeal will be granted?
- Why did the Court refuse to count the eleven-year delay mechanically from the date of the consent decree?
