Quashing is refused, so the FIR and the proceedings arising from it continue. The Court records no finding on the petitioner's guilt; whether the promise of marriage was false from the start is for the trial to determine on evidence.
- Case
- Saurabh Satyendrasingh Rajput v. State of Gujarat & Anr.
- Court
- High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026:GUJHC:70883
- Bench
- M. K. Thakker
- Judgment by
- M. K. Thakker
- Case numbers
- R/SCR.A/12857/2026
- Outcome
- Oral judgment dated 02-11-2026 dismissing R/Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No. 12857 of 2026; FIR C.R. No. 11191047260009 of 2026 stands and the rule is discharged.
Quashing refused: the FIR stands
On 2 November 2026, Justice M. K. Thakker of the Gujarat High Court dismissed a petition seeking the quashing of an FIR alleging sexual intercourse on a false promise of marriage, holding that the allegations disclosed a cognizable offence under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and that the petitioner's case did not meet the Supreme Court's Bhajan Lal criteria for quashing. The FIR, registered at the Mahila Police Station (East), Ahmedabad, and all proceedings arising from it, therefore stand.
The Court accepted that there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sexual relations, and between a mere breach of promise and a false promise. But on the facts before it, it held that the petitioner's refusal to marry the complainant, given without any reason after a physical relationship entered into under the guise of marriage, suggested that from the inception his intent was not to marry. That inference, the Court held, brought the case within Section 69, whose object is to protect against sexual assault under a false promise of marriage.
The FIR: engagement fixed, then refused
The petition sought the quashing of FIR C.R. No. 11191047260009 of 2026, registered at the Mahila Police Station (East), Ahmedabad, alleging an offence under Section 69 BNS. The petitioner, a computer engineer working as a front-end developer, and the complainant, aged 23 and studying in the third year of B.Com, belonged to the same community and had known each other for about two-and-a-half years.
According to the FIR, the two families agreed to the marriage, and the engagement was fixed at Hotel Silvera Grand but could not be performed because a family member of the petitioner died the same day. The complainant accompanied the petitioner to Udaipur on 24, 25 and 26 January 2025, where they entered into sexual relations on the promise of marriage, and the relations continued thereafter. The petitioner's father then demanded Rs 15 lakh for the continuation of the engagement, which the complainant's parents agreed to. In May 2026, when the complainant's father inquired about the date of marriage, the petitioner's family refused to marry the complainant, and the petitioner told the complainant that he did not want to marry her. The FIR followed.
The investigation material placed before the Court included a report of the Women Police Station (East), Ahmedabad City dated 29 June 2026, recording that the complainant had conceived and that the pregnancy, of five to six weeks, was terminated, and the statement of Dr Bindiya recorded on 16 June 2026, recording that the complainant and the petitioner had come together and requested the termination, with consent taken from both in Form-C.
The petitioner's case: breach, not a false promise
Counsel for the petitioner argued that the FIR itself showed the relationship was not created through any false representation made at the inception, and that no false intention to marry was reflected from the start of the relationship. The marriage, it was submitted, was being actively pursued by the families even after the relationship began, and the petitioner had not clearly denied marriage; the complainant had instead fixed 16 May 2026 for registering the marriage, which did not take place, and that led to the prosecution.
The submission rested on the settled distinction between a mere breach of promise and a false promise: the prosecution must establish that the promise was false when it was made and that the accused had no intention of fulfilling it from the very beginning. A subsequent refusal, it was argued, cannot retrospectively convert an otherwise consensual relationship into an offence, and the ingredients of Section 69 were therefore not made out.
The Court: an unexplained refusal points to intent from the start
The Court noted that the engagement had been fixed by the family members and was not solemnised because of a death in the petitioner's family, that the complainant was 23 years old, and that a demand of Rs 15 lakh had been raised by the petitioner's family and agreed to by the complainant's parents. It also noted the petitioner's insistence on 16 May 2026 as the date of marriage, which was not kept, and that the FIR resulted.
The Court then held that although the complainant was a mature woman of around 23 years, it could not be denied that the sexual relationship had developed under the guise of marriage, and that no reason had been stated by either side for not marrying. Without any reasons, denying the marriage after entering into a physical relationship under the guise of marriage would certainly attract a charge under Section 69, the Court held. Whether the accused actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to satisfy his lust can only be inferred by examining the circumstances, and the latter falls within cheating or deception. Here, the refusal to marry without citing any reason suggested that from the inception the intent was not to marry, but to enter into a physical relationship under the guise of a promise of marriage.
No quashing: a cognizable offence is disclosed
Applying State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (AIR 1992 SC 604), the Court held that a cognizable offence was disclosed against the petitioner and that his case did not fall under any of the criteria laid down in that decision for quashing. The continuation of the proceedings could therefore not be called an abuse of the process of law, and the Court declined to exercise its inherent powers to secure the ends of justice. The petition was dismissed and the rule discharged.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
This judgment turns on a single question of timing: was the promise of marriage false when it was made, or did it merely fail later? A broken engagement, on its own, is a breach of promise, not a crime. Section 69 BNS criminalises sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means, including a promise of marriage made without any intention of fulfilling it — so the prosecution must show the falsity existed at the inception, not merely that the marriage did not happen.
What makes this case useful is how the Court bridges that gap. It does not treat the refusal itself as proof; it treats the refusal, given without any reason after a relationship built on the promise and pursued by both families, as circumstantial evidence from which a mala fide intent from the start may be inferred. The absence of any explanation does the work: had a reason been given, the case might have looked like a mere breach. Students should note the limit the Court itself records — the inference is drawn from the circumstances at the quashing stage, where the Court asks only whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, not whether the charge is proved.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- The petitioner argued that a mere breach of a promise to marry is not a false promise. What fact did the Court rely on to hold that this case went beyond a mere breach, and why did the absence of any stated reason for refusing the marriage matter?
- Section 69 BNS turns on the accused's intention at the time the promise was made. How does the Court say that intention is to be inferred, and what role does the subsequent conduct of the parties play?
- The Court refused to quash the FIR after finding that a cognizable offence was disclosed and that the Bhajan Lal criteria were not met. What does that refusal decide, and what does it leave for the trial?