The order discharges the petitioner of the Section 309 IPC charge. It does not quash the proceeding in terms, does not interfere with the separate CISF disciplinary penalty, and does not hold that an attempt to suicide can never be investigated — investigation may still be needed to see whether material rebutting the presumption exists.
- Case
- Jyoti Bai v. State of Karnataka
- Court
- High Court of Karnataka
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026:KHC:62699
- Bench
- Suraj Govindaraj
- Judgment by
- Suraj Govindaraj
- Case numbers
- Crl.P. No. 8281 of 2025
- Outcome
- Criminal petition allowed; the Magistrate's order dated 26 December 2024 refusing discharge is set aside and the discharge application under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 is allowed.
Discharge allowed; the presumption was never considered
The Karnataka High Court has discharged a Central Industrial Security Force officer from a case under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, holding that Section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 creates a mandatory presumption of severe stress that the prosecution must rebut before such a person can be tried and punished.
Justice Suraj Govindaraj allowed the criminal petition filed by Jyoti Bai, a 37-year-old CISF Sub-Inspector, set aside the Magistrate's order dated 26 December 2024 refusing discharge, and allowed her discharge application under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Section 115 of the 2017 Act. The petition was reserved on 13 October 2026 and pronounced on 12 November 2026.
The incident, the case, and the discharge application
The petitioner was posted as shift-in-charge at Mallya Gate from 6 am to 1 pm on 12 October 2022. At around 6.10 am she fired one round from her service pistol at her abdomen. She underwent major surgery and prolonged hospitalisation. Disciplinary proceedings followed, with a major penalty of reduction of one stage of pay for life and no promotion for five years.
On a complaint by a CISF Constable, First Information Report in Crime No. 70 of 2022 was registered at Panambur Police Station under Section 309 IPC, and the case came before the Judicial Magistrate First Class II, Mangaluru as C.C. No. 2422 of 2023. She applied for discharge under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 115 of the 2017 Act; the Magistrate dismissed the application on 26 December 2024.
Her case was that she was under severe mental distress because of her inability to conceive: married in 2015, unable to conceive for more than eight years, told she had a blocked fallopian tube, she had consulted doctors in Kolkata, Jaipur and Mumbai and undergone IVF treatment between 2020 and 2022 without success. She said she directed the shot towards the part of her body she associated with her inability to bear a child.
Four questions for the Court
The Court framed four points: whether Section 115 negates or effaces the Section 309 offence; whether the presumption must be considered when a charge sheet is filed or a discharge application is decided; whether the Magistrate's order suffered from an infirmity; and what order should follow.
Counsel for the petitioner argued that the presumption was mandatory — “shall be presumed” leaves no discretion — and that the burden of rebutting it lay on the prosecution, which had placed no rebutting material. She relied on a co-ordinate Bench decision in Manoj Kumar and the Kerala High Court's decision in Simi C.N., and pointed out that Section 309 finds no place in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The State, supporting the trial court's order, placed no detailed counter-arguments on record.
BANTHRY ANALYSISSection 115: a mandatory presumption, not a mitigating factor
Section 115(1) of the 2017 Act begins with a non-obstante clause referring specifically to Section 309 IPC. It provides that a person who attempts suicide is presumed to have severe stress unless the contrary is proved, and is not to be tried and punished under the Code. The Court held that “shall be presumed” is mandatory: once an attempt is established the presumption must be drawn, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests on the prosecution.
The protection is not a mitigating circumstance at sentencing. So long as the presumption stands unrebutted, the person shall not be tried and punished — the provision reflects a legislative choice for care, treatment and rehabilitation over penal consequences, and Section 115(2) imposes a corresponding duty on the appropriate Government. At the same time, Section 115 does not repeal or efface Section 309: it qualifies the operation of the offence by a mandatory and rebuttable presumption. Section 100 of the Act reflects the same protective approach, though the Section 115 presumption operates independently of it.
The presumption applies at investigation and at discharge
The Court held that the presumption must be given effect at two stages. The Investigating Officer must consider it during investigation and when deciding whether to file a charge sheet under Section 309: the officer cannot ignore it for want of medical evidence, must examine the circumstances and collect any rebutting material, and must decide on prosecution only after giving effect to Section 115. Investigation is not prohibited in every case — an inquiry may be needed to see whether rebutting material exists — but the decision to prosecute must proceed in accordance with the provision.
The Magistrate, equally, cannot overlook the presumption when deciding discharge under Section 239, and cannot shift the burden to the accused by requiring her to establish severe stress at that stage. If the material contains nothing capable of rebutting the presumption, the charge under Section 309 would be groundless and the accused entitled to discharge.
Applying that test, the Court found the Magistrate's order wanting: the order dated 26 December 2024 did not consider the effect of the presumption, did not examine whether the prosecution material could rebut it, and did not consider the circumstances of the injury, including the medical history. The failure to consider Section 115, the Court held, went to the root of the matter: the circumstances were consistent with the presumption, and the prosecution had placed no material capable of rebutting it. Being on duty and using a service firearm did not by itself rebut the presumption.
Discharge allowed; directions on force welfare
The criminal petition was allowed: the Magistrate's order dated 26 December 2024 was set aside, and the discharge application under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 115 of the 2017 Act was allowed. The Court did not in terms quash the entire proceeding; the relief granted was discharge from the Section 309 charge.
The Court then addressed the wider issue. Noting that the petitioner had access to a service firearm by virtue of her duties, it called on the authorities to review their policies and strengthen mental-health and welfare measures for personnel in the armed forces, the police and other security organisations, while ensuring firearms are used safely and responsibly. It directed that a copy of the order be forwarded to the Director General of the CISF, the Director General of Police, Karnataka, and the heads of other State organisations with personnel entrusted with firearms. Its observations covered fitness assessments before entrusting firearms and periodically thereafter, accessible and confidential counselling and treatment, and sensitisation of supervisory officers to recognise signs of distress.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
The judgment is a careful study of how a non-obstante clause works. Section 115 does not delete Section 309 from the statute book — it displaces its operation for a person protected by the presumption. The offence survives for cases outside the presumption, but a prosecution within it cannot proceed unless the State first rebuts the presumption. Note the burden: the accused need not prove severe stress by medical evidence; the prosecution must prove the contrary.
Note also the two-stage discipline the Court imposed: the Investigating Officer must apply the presumption before deciding to charge, and the Magistrate must apply it again at discharge. A discharge order that never engages with Section 115 is vulnerable for that reason alone. Finally, distinguish the relief: the Court allowed the discharge application rather than quashing the proceeding, and the order does not touch the separate disciplinary penalty.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- What does Section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 presume, and who bears the burden of rebutting it?
- At which two stages did the Court hold the Section 115 presumption must be considered?
- Why did the Court hold that the Magistrate's order dated 26 December 2024 suffered from an infirmity?