The acquittal rests on the state of the prosecution evidence — inconsistent dying declarations and the limits on reversing an acquittal — not on a finding that no offence occurred; Sunitabai's death by burn injuries is undisputed.
- Case
- Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil v. The State of Maharashtra
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 1196
- Bench
- Ujjal Bhuyan; Atul S. Chandurkar
- Judgment by
- Atul S. Chandurkar
- Case numbers
- Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 2018
- Outcome
- Final judgment allowing Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 2018: High Court judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2008 dated 28 September 2017 quashed; appellant acquitted of the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and to be set free forthwith if not required in any other case.
Acquittal restored; High Court conviction quashed
The Supreme Court has acquitted Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, quashing the Bombay High Court's judgment that had reversed her acquittal and sentenced her to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs 25,000. A Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar delivered the reportable judgment on 5 November 2026.
The Court held that the Sessions Court was correct to give the appellant the benefit of doubt because the three dying declarations of the deceased were inconsistent with each other, and that the High Court was wrong to accept one of them — the statement in the medico-legal case papers, Exhibit-56 — without any corroborating evidence, while discarding the other two.
The Court directed that the appellant be set free forthwith, if not required in any other case.
A death by burns in 2005; three statements, three versions
Sunitabai, the wife of Shamkant (accused No. 1) and the daughter-in-law of the appellant, was set on fire on 10 April 2005 at about 10 am. She was admitted to the Civil Hospital with burn injuries and died on 15 April 2005. The post-mortem found 90 per cent burns, with the cause of death recorded as septicaemia due to thermal burns.
The prosecution alleged that Sunitabai had been ill-treated by her husband and his family amid a demand of dowry, and that on 10 April 2005 all the accused, in furtherance of their common intention, set her on fire. Charges were framed against four accused for offences under Sections 498A, 342, 406 and 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code.
Three dying declarations were recorded. In the statements at Exhibit-44, recorded by Assistant Sub-Inspector Prakash Wagh, and Exhibit-48, recorded by the Special Executive Magistrate, the deceased stated that her father-in-law (accused No. 2) had set her on fire. In the statement in the medico-legal case papers at Exhibit-56, she stated that the appellant had set her on fire.
Why the Sessions Court acquitted
The Sessions Court acquitted the accused. It found the three dying declarations inconsistent with each other: two said the father-in-law set the deceased on fire, while the third said the appellant did. It also noted that Vishwas Desle, who had extinguished the fire and taken the deceased to hospital, was not examined by the prosecution; that no witness was examined to indicate the presence of any piece of rope although the prosecution said the deceased's hands and legs had been tied; that no neighbours were examined; and that the medico-legal papers showed the deceased admitted by her uncle, PW-6, who did not say in evidence that he had admitted her.
The State appealed. The High Court, Bench at Aurangabad, maintained the acquittal of three of the four accused but convicted the appellant alone for the substantive offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code, sentencing her to rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs 25,000, in default rigorous imprisonment for one year. The appellant challenged that conviction before the Supreme Court.
Two questions on reversing an acquittal
The appeal raised two questions. First, whether a High Court hearing an appeal against acquittal may reverse it by accepting one dying declaration and discarding two others that contradict it, without corroboration. Second, whether the appellant could be convicted alone for the substantive offence under Section 302 when the other three accused, charged jointly with her under Section 34, stood acquitted.
The Court also examined whether the prosecution could rely on Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to shift the burden to the appellant for matters within her knowledge, and whether the High Court had complied with the requirement to hear the appellant on sentence after reversing her acquittal.
Inconsistent declarations, an impossible joint-liability finding
On the dying declarations, the Court applied the principles from Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi): every dying declaration must be voluntary and reliable, and where there are multiple inconsistent declarations, each case must be decided on its own facts after examining the entirety of the material and the circumstances of each statement, as held in Jagbir Singh. The Court independently assessed the evidence and found the Sessions Court's view could not be called perverse or illegal.
The Court stressed the standard for an appeal against acquittal: the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is enhanced by an acquittal, and the High Court ought to have given due consideration to the inconsistency before reversing the Sessions Court. Accepting Exhibit-56 without any corroborating evidence could not sustain the conviction.
On joint liability, the Court held that the High Court's position was legally impossible. Three of the four accused had been acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34, which in law meant they had not acted conjointly with the appellant; the appellant therefore could not have acted conjointly with them. The appellant was, in any event, convicted for the substantive offence under Section 302, a charge that was never framed against her.
The Court added two further infirmities. Section 106 of the Evidence Act comes into play only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden; it cannot be used to make up for the prosecution's failure to prove the elements of the offence. And after reversing the acquittal, the High Court was required by Section 386(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to hear the appellant on the quantum of sentence, which the record showed it had not done.
Conviction quashed; appellant to be set free
For these reasons, the Court quashed the High Court's judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2008 dated 28 September 2017 and acquitted the appellant of the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code, directing that she be set free forthwith if not required in any other case.
The judgment decides the appellant's conviction only. It does not disturb the acquittal of the other three accused, which the High Court had maintained, and it expresses no view on the charges under Sections 498A, 342 and 406 beyond the Sessions Court's finding, noted in the judgment, that the offence under Section 498A could not be proved merely on the basis of the stamp paper at Exhibit-37.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
This judgment is a compact revision of three doctrines. First, multiple dying declarations: inconsistency does not automatically destroy all of them, but a court must test each one for voluntariness and reliability and cannot cherry-pick one without corroboration while ignoring the rest. Second, appeals against acquittal: the appellate court must show why the trial court's view was perverse or illegal, not merely that another view was possible — and an acquittal strengthens, rather than weakens, the presumption of innocence.
Third, the Section 34 point is a useful exam trap. Common intention requires joint action; if the co-accused are acquitted on the ground that they did not take part, a sole accused cannot be convicted of acting conjointly with them. And remember the two procedural safeguards the Court flags: Section 106 of the Evidence Act never relieves the prosecution of its initial burden, and Section 386(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a hearing on sentence whenever an acquittal is reversed into a conviction.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the Supreme Court hold that the Sessions Court was right to give the appellant the benefit of doubt, and what did the High Court fail to consider before reversing the acquittal?
- The three dying declarations differed on one decisive point. What was it, and why did the inconsistency matter?
- The High Court convicted the appellant alone under Section 302 IPC while maintaining the acquittal of the other three accused. Why did the Supreme Court describe that as a legally impossible position?
