This order decides only the fate of this appeal. It lays down no new rule on disability reservation: the Court expressly barred the High Court's direction from being cited as precedent, and it did not examine the merits of the reservation dispute afresh.
- Case
- The Karnataka Public Service Commission v. Mr. Shamashuddin M. Savadatti & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Bench
- Dipankar Datta; Sheel Nagu
- Judgment by
- Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu (bench order)
- Case numbers
- Civil Appeal No. 12896 of 2024
- Outcome
- Civil Appeal No. 12896 of 2024 disposed of on 15 October 2026 with observations: the impugned High Court order shall not be read as a precedent; benefits due to the first respondent under that order to be released; the State may consider the third respondent's claim if he had approached it in terms of the High Court's order.
What the Court decided
The Supreme Court has disposed of the Karnataka Public Service Commission's appeal against a 2015 Karnataka High Court judgment, refusing to disturb a direction that the State appoint the first respondent, Shamashuddin M. Savadatti, to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) in the 2A/PH category.
The operative part of the 15 October 2026 order is a compromise of finality and caution: the appeal stands disposed of, but the Court expressly observed that the impugned High Court order "shall not be read as a precedent for deciding future cases." Whatever benefit the first respondent is entitled to under the High Court's order must be released to him if not already released, and the State may now consider the claim of the third respondent, Manjunath, if he had approached the authorities in terms of the High Court's order.
The selection dispute
The first respondent had applied for the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) under the physically handicapped category/2B. The KPSC had reserved 21 of 648 available posts for persons with disabilities. He secured an aggregate of 67.76% marks in the written test and interview and was ranked 15th — but his name did not feature in the final selection list.
The KPSC's stand was that he fell in the 2B/PH category, where only one seat was reserved and which went to Ayaz Pasha (70.11%). As for the single post reserved under the 2A/PH category, the KPSC claimed the first respondent did not fall in that category either, and that a non-disabled candidate, Manjunath, had been selected for it in the absence of available disabled candidates. The first respondent's original application before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal was dismissed on 19 May 2010.
What the High Court had held
Allowing the first respondent's writ petition (No. 41267/2010 (S-KAT)) on 18 December 2015, the High Court quashed the Tribunal's order and the final selection list of 16.10.2008 so far as Manjunath's selection under the 2A/PH category was concerned. It held that the procedure under Sections 33 and 36 of the governing disability-reservation statute had not been followed while filling the 21 reserved posts, and that Manjunath — admittedly a non-disabled person from an entirely different category whose name did not even figure in the marks list — had been wrongly selected under the 2A/PH category, which was "contrary to law" and "impermissible."
The High Court declared the petitioner entitled to appointment as Assistant Engineer (Civil) under the 2A/PH category. Balancing equities, it added that since Manjunath had been in service for more than seven years, he could approach the competent authority for an alternative remedy if permissible in law.
Why the Supreme Court let the direction stand
The Supreme Court noted that despite service of notice, the first respondent had not appeared before it — but also recorded that the promotions he had earned over the years since his Tribunal application was dismissed had been noted in its earlier order of 23 September 2026. "Much water has flown under the bridge," the Bench observed.
Having perused the High Court's reasoning, the Court found that its observations and directions were made considering the special facts of the case. Since the High Court had, more than a decade ago, required the State to appoint the first respondent in place of Manjunath while simultaneously protecting Manjunath's interest, and since Manjunath had not independently appealed the quashing of his appointment, the Court held it would not be prudent "at this distance of time to disturb the findings which are based on the facts of the case."
BANTHRY ANALYSISAnalysis: finality tempered by a no-precedent caveat
This is a classic "let sleeping findings lie" disposition. The Court did not endorse the High Court's reading of Sections 33 and 36, nor did it examine whether the KPSC's category-mapping was right or wrong. Instead it relied on delay, settled equities, and the absence of a challenge by the affected candidate.
The no-precedent direction is the doctrinally significant part. By quarantining the High Court's order, the Court ensured that future disability-reservation disputes cannot cite this outcome as authority — the question of how reserved PH posts must be filled across sub-categories remains open for a case argued on full merits.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
Note the technique: the Court distinguishes between the correctness of a judgment and the prudence of disturbing it. "Much water has flown under the bridge" is the equitable language of delay and settled expectations — compare it with the doctrine of laches. Also note how the Court protects both sides of a zero-sum selection dispute: the rightful candidate keeps his appointment and promotions, while the wrongly-appointed candidate is given a second chance to seek an alternative remedy instead of being thrown out.
Finally, observe the no-precedent caveat as a judicial management tool: when a court resolves a case on its peculiar facts without wanting to settle the law, it says so expressly. In your answers, distinguish ratio decidendi from case-specific directions.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the Supreme Court decline to treat the Karnataka High Court's direction as a precedent, and what does that limitation mean for future litigants?
- What two protections did the High Court build into its order for the wrongly-appointed candidate, and how did the Supreme Court deal with them?
- On what ground did the KPSC refuse to recommend the first respondent, and why did the High Court hold that refusal contrary to law?
