This order does not ban criticism of judgments or peaceful gatherings about court rulings, does not decide the guilt of any person in the two FIRs, does not fix a calendar deadline for those investigations, and does not grant the full set of guidelines the petitioner had sought.
- Case
- R. Karthikeyan v. Union of India
- Court
- High Court of Judicature at Madras
- Decision
- Bench
- Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, C.J.; G. Arul Murugan J.
- Judgment by
- Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, C.J.
- Case numbers
- W.P. No. 30622 of 2026
- Outcome
- Public interest writ petition under Article 226 disposed of with four directions; no order as to costs; connected miscellaneous petitions closed.
Disposed of with four directions: criticism of a judgment is protected, personal targeting of a judge is not
On 30 October 2026, the High Court of Judicature at Madras disposed of a public interest writ petition seeking protection against protests that personally target sitting judges, issuing four directions to the State police and district administration.
The Court drew a clear line: citizens may disagree with a judgment, but coordinated action using abusive, defamatory or caste-based language against the judge who authored it is not protected free speech. At the same time, it refused a blanket ban on public discussion or peaceful gatherings concerning court rulings.
The Madurai Bench judgment — and the protests that followed, as the petitioner described them
The petition traces back to a judgment delivered on 25 June 2026 by a Division Bench sitting at the Madurai Bench in W.P.(MD) No. 7217 of 2022, which declared G.O.(Ms.) No. 31 dated 9 March 2024, issued by the Backward Classes, Most Backward Classes and Minorities Welfare Department, unconstitutional, holding that a person cannot claim backward class benefits purely by virtue of religious conversion.
The petitioner said that following that declaration, several organisations, including the fourth and fifth respondents, launched wide-ranging protests across Tamil Nadu that moved past normal criticism into personalised, hostile campaigns directed at one sitting member of the Division Bench, with posters, rallies and social media videos using abusive and caste-based remarks designed to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.
These accounts are the petitioner's case as recorded by the Court, not findings about any individual protester; the judgment decides the petition on directions, not on any person's guilt.
What was asked, and what the State answered
The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus under Article 226 directing the Union and State authorities to take effective preventive and penal measures against organised campaigns, meetings, processions, demonstrations, speeches and social media publications that scandalise or intimidate the judiciary or personally target any sitting judge, to register criminal cases and investigate fairly and expeditiously, to act against those responsible, and to frame guidelines governing permission for public meetings, processions and demonstrations relating to judicial proceedings or personally targeting constitutional courts and sitting judges.
The State, through the third respondent, answered that the petition relied on broad generalisations without crucial details, and that it does not tolerate unlawful personal attacks on judges. When the fourth respondent attempted an unpermitted protest in Madurai on 29 June 2026, police denied permission and, when protesters assembled anyway, registered FIR No. 152 of 2026; FIR No. 158 of 2026 was registered against members of the fifth respondent for a similar violation on 3 July 2026. The State also pointed to the existing framework — Sections 148 and 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita and Section 41 of the Chennai City Police Act — and argued that blanket orders banning all assemblies related to court decisions would violate constitutional freedoms and ignore case-by-case assessment.
In reply, the petitioner argued that individuals prominently visible in circulated photographic and video evidence had not been arrayed as accused in the FIRs, which, counsel said, made it a case of res ipsa loquitur showing law enforcement had failed to take genuine and effective action.
The balance: free speech, judicial independence, and what an FIR is for
The Court framed the case as a careful balance between two fundamental constitutional values: the individual right to free speech and the institutional right to judicial independence. True judicial independence, it said, means judges must be free to decide cases based solely on the law and the facts before them; the Supreme Court has reiterated that an independent judiciary is part of the basic structure, and personal abuse, hostile threats or coordinated intimidation because of judicial decisions would strike at the root of the legal system.
The line turns on Article 19: freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a) protects fair, reasoned criticism of legal rulings, but not deliberate personal attacks or intimidation, and the Court held that coordinated actions using abusive, defamatory or caste-based language against a sitting judge fall outside protection under the reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2).
On the facts, the Court found the police had not remained entirely passive — they had denied permissions and registered cases when groups defied those orders — but the scale of the protests showed regular local measures are not always enough for coordinated digital and physical campaigns, and enforcement must act quickly and uniformly across all districts.
On the missing names, the Court rejected the res ipsa loquitur argument: an FIR is not intended to be an encyclopaedia of the incident or an exhaustive roster of every offender at the very threshold. Registration of the two FIRs established that criminal law had been duly set in motion, and the identification of specific persons visible in digital evidence is a matter for investigation. The mere absence of names at the preliminary stage does not imply institutional passivity, so long as the investigation is carried to its logical conclusion fairly and thoroughly.
The four directions in paragraph 15
First, the State police and district administration shall continue to evaluate all applications for public meetings, marches or protests regarding judicial matters on a strict case-by-case basis, under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita and local Police Acts.
Second, no permission shall be granted for any public gathering or march that aims to personally target, defame or intimidate a sitting judge; if a permitted assembly turns into a personal attack, the officers concerned shall end the event immediately and take appropriate legal action.
Third, the Cyber Crime Division of the State Police shall maintain active surveillance over digital platforms, so that online content does not cross into criminal intimidation of sitting judges, and shall initiate swift action in accordance with law against any infractions.
Fourth, the police shall complete the investigation into FIR No. 152 of 2026 and FIR No. 158 of 2026, at the B-5 Southgate Police Station, in a fair, thorough and expeditious manner. The direction sets that standard but fixes no calendar deadline.
Disposed of, no costs, connected petitions closed — and what the order does not do
The writ petition was disposed of with those directions. There is no order as to costs, and all connected miscellaneous petitions — W.M.P. Nos. 33648, 33645 and 33646 of 2026 — are closed. No interim order is continued in the operative part, and no separate liberty to approach the court again is granted.
The order does not ban criticism of judgments or peaceful gatherings about court rulings, does not decide any person's guilt, and does not grant the full guidelines sought; it gives directions instead, and the two FIR investigations remain pending to the standard the Court set.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students: three doctrines doing the work
First, the Article 19(1)(a)–19(2) line: criticism of a legal conclusion and attack on the judge who authored it are legally different acts. The first is protected expression; the second, when it uses abusive or defamatory language in a coordinated campaign, falls within the reasonable restrictions on speech.
Second, the FIR threshold: an FIR sets criminal law in motion; it is not a charge sheet. So the absence of every visible participant's name at registration cannot by itself prove police inaction — the test is whether the investigation is carried to its logical conclusion fairly and thoroughly.
Third, case-by-case over blanket bans: the Court refuses both extremes. A blanket ban would infringe legitimate democratic expression, but a purely passive, district-by-district response is not enough for coordinated campaigns — hence individual assessment of each application, a hard rule against personally targeted gatherings, and an active online-surveillance duty.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- What line does the Court draw between criticising a judgment and attacking the judge who wrote it, and which Article 19 provision supports it?
- Why did the Court reject the argument that missing names in the FIRs proved police inaction?
- Why did the Court refuse a blanket ban on gatherings about court rulings while still barring permission for personally targeted gatherings?
