This order decides only the two threshold applications. It does not decide whether the election is void, whether Dilip Kumar's nomination was improperly rejected, whether the returned candidate's nomination was improperly accepted, or whether any Form-26 disclosure was actually suppressed — all of those are triable issues for evidence at trial. The Court's observations are confined to deciding the applications and are not an expression of opinion on the merits of the election petition.
- Case
- Udhayanidhi Stalin v P. Milany
- Court
- High Court of Judicature at Madras
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026:MHC:4551
- Bench
- G. Arul Murugan, J.
- Judgment by
- G. Arul Murugan, J.
- Case numbers
- O.A. Nos. 860 and 861 of 2026 in E.L.P. No. 18 of 2026
- Outcome
- Common order dismissing O.A. Nos. 860 and 861 of 2026, seeking rejection of, and striking out of pleadings in, Election Petition No. 18 of 2026. The election petition proceeds to trial; the returned candidate must file his reply statement within four weeks.
Both threshold applications dismissed
The High Court of Judicature at Madras has refused to reject the election petition challenging Udhayanidhi Stalin's election from the Chepauk constituency, and refused to strike out its pleadings. Justice G. Arul Murugan held that the petition falls within no clause of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and pleads the material facts required by section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The pleadings in paragraphs 6 to 23 were neither unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous nor vexatious, so Order VI Rule 16 was not attracted.
The common order, reserved on 26 October and pronounced on 13 November 2026, dismisses O.A. Nos. 860 and 861 of 2026. The returned candidate must file his reply statement within four weeks, and the petition is listed on 11 December 2026. The Court's observations are confined to these applications, expressing no opinion on the merits.
The petition and the challenge to it
P. Milany, an independent candidate at the 2026 general election to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly from the Chepauk constituency, presented Election Petition No. 18 of 2026 under section 81, seeking a declaration that the election is void under sections 100(1)(c), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv). The election was announced on 15 March 2026, polled on 23 April, and the results declared on 4 May 2026.
The returned candidate filed two applications: one under Order VI Rule 16 to strike out pleadings, and the other under Order VII Rule 11 to reject the petition. The rejection application rested on three grounds: the petition was presented on the 46th day and so barred by section 81; the averments were vague and lacked the material facts required by section 83; and Dilip Kumar, whose nomination was said to have been improperly rejected, had not been impleaded.
Limitation: the 46th day was in time
Section 81(1) permits a petition within forty-five days from the date of election, and section 86 requires dismissal of a non-complying petition. The Act is a self-contained code: no condonation is possible, and a single day's delay is fatal. The question was how the forty-five days are reckoned — whether the date of election is excluded, so the period begins the next day, or counted as the first day.
The Court held the issue settled by the three-judge bench in Tarun Prasad Chatterjee, where the petition had likewise been presented on the forty-sixth day: applying section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the Supreme Court excluded the date of election to secure the full forty-five days. The returned candidate relied on the later three-judge bench decision in Youaraj Rai, but section 9 was not in issue there — that case turned on identifying the date of election.
Applying Tarun Prasad Chatterjee, the results having been declared on 4 May 2026, that date stood excluded: the forty-five days ran from 5 May to 18 June 2026, and the petition, presented on 18 June, was filed on the last day, in time.
Dilip Kumar's nomination: a triable issue
The petition invokes section 100(1)(c): Dilip Kumar's nomination was improperly rejected. The returned candidate contended that Dilip Kumar, not being a party, meant the petition must fail, and that the Handbook instructions applied only to candidates of recognised parties. The Court disagreed. Under section 82, only the returned candidate need be joined where voidness alone is sought. Since the petitioner sought only voidness and alleged no corrupt practice against Dilip Kumar, sections 82 and 84 contemplate a challenge to the improper rejection of another candidate's nomination without joining him.
On the merits, the petition pleads that Tamilaga Vetri Kazhagam is an unrecognised registered party, that Dilip Kumar filed his nomination on 6 April 2026 as its candidate, and that it was rejected on 7 April because the main candidate's nomination had been accepted. He had filed under Part-II and paragraph C(ii) of Part-III of Form-2B, subscribed by ten electors, and the Returning Officer is said to have rejected it without following instructions 6.10.3, 6.10.3(iv) and 6.10.3(vii), failing to treat him as an independent candidate. The returned candidate answered that the form indicated no order of preference of symbols. Whether the rejection was improper, and whether paragraph 6 or 8 of the Handbook governs, are triable issues — but the petition pleads the material facts, and improper rejection is a ground for voidness under section 100(1)(c).
BANTHRY ANALYSISThe threshold test
Under Order VII Rule 11, the court looks only at the averments in the petition read as a whole, with the documents filed with it; the written statement is wholly immaterial. The power is exercised only where a meaningful reading shows the petition manifestly vexatious and meritless. The same discipline governs Order VI Rule 16. That is why the returned candidate's explanations could not be weighed here: the question is only whether the petition pleads material facts, not whether they are true.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
Two lessons stand out. First, limitation is unforgiving but precisely computed: section 81 allows no condonation, yet the forty-five days exclude the date of election under section 9 of the General Clauses Act — so a petition filed on the 46th calendar day can still be in time. Second, threshold and merits differ: a petition survives Order VII Rule 11 because it pleads material facts with particulars, not because they are proved. The trial will test whether the nomination was improperly rejected, whether the affidavit was defective or suppressing, and whether any of it affected the result — none of which this order decides.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Under section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, how is the forty-five-day period computed, and why was a petition presented on the forty-sixth day from the date of election held to be in time?
- Why did the Court hold that Dilip Kumar, whose nomination was allegedly improperly rejected, did not need to be joined as a party to the election petition?
- At the Order VII Rule 11 stage, what material may the court look at, and why could the returned candidate's explanations for the alleged Form-26 non-disclosures not be considered?
