This judgment does not overrule Javed v. State of Haryana, does not strike down Section 14(1)(j-1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, and does not finally decide the validity of the two-child disqualification: the validity of the Maharashtra provision was not challenged before the Court and was not adjudicated. The appellant's continuance as Sarpanch is interim only, until disposal of the civil appeal, and the final outcome awaits the larger bench.
- Case
- Mangala Bhimrao Ingle v. Additional Commissioner, Amravati Division & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 1193
- Bench
- Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha; Alok Aradhe
- Judgment by
- Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
- Case numbers
- SLP(C) No. 30772 of 2025
- Outcome
- Leave granted; reference to a larger bench for reconsideration of the ratio in Javed v. State of Haryana; interim order (stay of the High Court judgment) continues until disposal of the civil appeal. The disqualification provision itself is not struck down.
Reference to a larger bench, and the sarpanch stays in office meanwhile
The Supreme Court has referred the challenge to the two-child disqualification for panchayat office to a larger bench, asking for an immediate re-examination of its 2003 precedent in Javed v. State of Haryana. A bench of Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe said the laws penalising more than two children have lost their relevance because the fear of overpopulation on which they rested has crumbled.
Leave was granted, converting the special leave petition into a civil appeal, and the Registry was directed to place the judgment before the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate bench. In the meantime, the interim order already in force continues until the civil appeal is disposed of, so the appellant continues in her elected position as Sarpanch of Kakoda Gram Panchayat.
The judgment is marked reportable. Its operative step is a reference, not a final ruling on the disqualification itself: the Court did not strike down the provision, and the 2003 precedent stands until a larger bench reconsiders it.
A third child, a 2022 election, and a disqualification
Mangala Bhimrao Ingle gave birth to a third child in 2014 and was then elected Sarpanch of Kakoda Gram Panchayat in the 2022 elections. Her election was set aside on the ground that she was disqualified from contesting panchayat elections because she had more than two children, in violation of Section 14(1)(j-1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959.
When the Supreme Court entertained her special leave petition and issued notice, it stayed the High Court's judgment, permitting her to continue in office. The bench records that the only argument her counsel could then advance was that there was no conclusive proof of the third child because the place of issue on the birth certificate was allegedly not valid.
The bench makes clear that its enquiry was not about whether the High Court had correctly applied the governing law or the precedents. Its concern was the relevance of these laws now that the very foundation for their articulation has changed.
What Javed decided in 2003
In Javed v. State of Haryana, decided in 2003 and reported as (2003) 8 SCC 369, the Supreme Court upheld the disqualification of persons with more than two living children from running for or holding panchayat positions under the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The validity of the provisions was tested against Article 14 by applying the twin test of intelligible differentia and a rational connection to the object sought to be achieved, and the Court concluded that the equality clause had not been violated.
The legislation's purpose, as the Court then understood it, rested on the perception of a population boom and its negative impact on the economy, drawing on the situation in China as of 2000 and on successive five-year plans that had failed to alter the rate of population growth.
The present bench says it is compelled to revisit the ratio in Javed because, with the passage of time, the very foundation of the judgment has drastically changed, and the assumptions undertaken in 2003 do not hold much ground anymore.
From a fertility rate of 3.0 to 1.9
The bench's central factual claim is demographic. India's Total Fertility Rate has fallen from 3.02 around the time of Javed (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Women and Men in India 2006, cited in the judgment) to 1.9 according to the Registrar General's Sample Registration System Statistical Report 2024, while the most recent National Family Health Survey (NFHS-6) estimates it at about 2.0 children per woman as of 2024. The replacement level, at which one generation exactly replaces itself without migration, is 2.1, so India is now below replacement level fertility.
The Court adds that India's total population has neither begun to decline nor is such a decline expected immediately, because of demographic momentum: large numbers born during earlier decades of higher fertility are now in their reproductive and working years. But the share of persons aged 60 and above has already risen from about 8.3 per cent in 2014 to 9.7 per cent in 2024, with government projections placing that share at nearly 15 per cent by 2036.
The conclusion the bench draws is blunt: laws aimed at limiting population growth have now lost their significance, and a TFR below replacement level will soon produce a demographic transition towards an older population with a declining share of the working-age population.
Can a law become unconstitutional as its foundation changes?
An important limit frames the whole judgment. The constitutional validity of the applicable provision of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act was not challenged before the Court, and the bench says it may not adjudicate directly upon its validity. What it does instead is observe that a law considered reasonable at the time of its enactment has, with changed social circumstances, lost its original rationale and effectiveness, so that its continued operation may warrant reconsideration.
The bench grounds that move in a broader account of justice. Adapting to change, it says, is one of four aspects of achieving justice, and failure to adapt produces injustice and is, in a sense, an abuse of power. Legal reform through legislative correction is the most effective route, and the executive has a constitutional duty to monitor how a statute actually works.
The bench also traces how far Javed's reasoning travelled. Although the provisions analysed in Javed were repealed by an Amendment Act of 2006, its reasoning became an important precedent for sustaining further restrictions on eligibility for local self-government, and it influenced the Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 2015, which added disqualifications based on minimum education, outstanding cooperative dues, unpaid electricity dues and the absence of a functional toilet at the candidate's residence.
Rajbala, Sukanya Shantha, and who bears the exclusion
In Rajbala v. State of Haryana, reported as (2016) 2 SCC 445, the Court expressly relied on Javed while upholding further qualifications and disqualifications for panchayati raj elections. The present bench notes the severity of that exclusion: on the educational data placed before the Court, the prescribed qualifications would render approximately 68 per cent of Scheduled Caste women and 41 per cent of Scheduled Caste men ineligible to contest.
The constitutional framework has meanwhile moved. In Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, a three-judge bench expressly questioned the reasoning in Rajbala, particularly its failure to consider the disproportionate exclusion of Scheduled Castes, and recognised that the exclusionary impact of such legislation raised concerns of indirect discrimination, even though it did not directly reconsider Javed or Rajbala.
The bench then examines three impacts of the two-child norm. On representation, it recalls Dr Ambedkar's description of citizenship as a bundle of rights in which representation and holding office are the two most important rights. On women, it says Javed's answer, that men and women would stand equally disqualified, does not sit with social realities: a 2009 study sponsored by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj found the norm tended to weaken women's position in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat, and documented forced abortions, desertion of pregnant wives and denial of paternity resorted to in order to evade disqualification. On reproductive autonomy, it holds that the choice of whether, when and how many children to have is among the most intimate decisions, protected under Article 21, and that the norm forces an unconscionable choice between bearing children and democratic participation.
What happens next
The Court concludes that it has revisited the legality, propriety and constitutional morality of imposing drastic disabilities and disqualifications for bearing more than two children, and that even if the law was legal and valid at the time of its making, it has become invalid as the foundation on which it rested has changed. That conclusion, however, is expressed through a reference: the matter goes to a larger bench for reconsideration of the ratio in Javed, with the Registry directed to place the judgment before the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate bench.
Until the larger bench decides, two things hold. First, the interim order continues until disposal of the civil appeal, so Ingle remains Sarpanch of Kakoda Gram Panchayat for now. Second, the disqualification itself has not been struck down by this judgment, and the final outcome awaits the larger bench. The Court also places on record the valuable assistance of Ms Rukhmini Bobde, learned amicus curiae.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
For law students, this judgment is a study in how precedent ages. Rather than deciding the validity question itself, the bench builds a record of changed facts and changed constitutional understanding, and refers the question to a larger bench for reconsideration of the Javed ratio.
The questions to watch are practical: which bench the Chief Justice of India constitutes, how the reference is framed, and whether legislatures move on two-child disqualifications before the larger bench decides. Until then, the disqualification remains law, and Ingle's continuance in office rests on an interim order, not a final ruling.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the bench say a two-judge bench could not finally decide the validity of the two-child disqualification, and what procedural step did it take instead?
- What demographic figures does the judgment rely on to say the foundation of Javed has changed, and why does a TFR below 2.1 matter to that argument?
- How does the bench connect the two-child norm to Article 21 reproductive autonomy, and why does it say the burden falls disproportionately on women?
