This order does not decide whether the FIRs or their registration were lawful, whether the corruption allegations are true, whether the ED's Section 66(2) communication made FIR registration mandatory, or whether the subsequent ECIR is valid. Those questions, and the appeals themselves, are before the Kerala High Court Division Bench. The stay pauses only the investigation, for ten days from 21 October 2026 — the FIRs remain in place.
- Case
- Pinarayi Vijayan v. K.M. Shajahan and others
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Bench
- Justice Joymalya Bagchi; Justice V. Mohana
- Judgment by
- Justice Joymalya Bagchi
- Case numbers
- SLP(Crl.) Nos. 20437/2026, 20425/2026, 20471/2026, 20504/2026; Diary No. 65479/2026
- Outcome
- Criminal appeals (leave granted 21 October 2026, disposed of in terms of the signed order) setting aside the Kerala High Court Division Bench's 15 October 2026 refusal of leave to appeal; appeals restored to file before the Division Bench; investigation in FIRs VC 6/2026/SIU-1 and VC 7/2026/SIU-1 stayed for ten days to enable interim-relief applications.
Appeals restored, investigation paused for ten days
On 21 October 2026, a vacation Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana set aside the Kerala High Court Division Bench's order refusing leave to appeal, holding that Pinarayi Vijayan, Veena T., P.A. Mohamed Riyas and a fourth appellant had locus to appeal against the single judge's 9 October 2026 order directing registration of First Information Reports in the CMRL-Exalogic matter. Leave was granted, the appeals were disposed of in terms of the signed order, and the appellants were permitted to pursue their appeals before the Division Bench, with the appeals restored to file.
To enable the appellants to seek interim relief, the Court directed that the investigation in the impugned FIRs — VC 6/2026/SIU-1 and VC 7/2026/SIU-1 at PS-SIU-1, Thiruvananthapuram, registered on 12 October 2026 — shall remain stayed for ten days from 21 October 2026. The Court clarified that the stay shall not be treated as a conclusive opinion on interim relief, and that the Division Bench remains entitled to fashion such relief independently.
From an ED communication to two registered FIRs
The Enforcement Directorate, through counsel Mr. Zoheb Hossain, submitted that the Serious Fraud Investigation Office had commenced an investigation under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 into the affairs of M/s CMRL and M/s Exalogic — the latter a wholly owned company of Veena T. — and that materials which transpired, including transfer of funds to foreign shores by Veena T. and her husband, led the ED to share information under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 with the State Government for action as per law. On that communication, the Director General of Police constituted a nine-member Special Investigation Team to conduct a preliminary enquiry.
Respondent No. 1, K.M. Shajahan — the writ petitioner before the High Court — contended that the preliminary enquiry was a dilatory tactic to avoid registering an FIR, and approached the High Court. The single judge quashed the State's decision to hold a preliminary enquiry and directed the Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Thiruvananthapuram, to register FIRs based on the Section 66(2) information for the offences disclosed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and to investigate through competent officers and file a final report.
The appellants had not been parties in the writ proceedings. Their applications for leave to appeal were dismissed by the Division Bench, which held that the impugned judgment had not affected their right to pursue their constitutional or statutory remedy against the FIR registration, that no preliminary inquiry was needed where Section 66(2) material disclosed cognizable offences, and that the accused in a corruption case had no legal right to be heard before the FIR was registered.
The issue: can non-parties appeal an FIR-direction order?
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellants — not parties to the writ, and not heard by the single judge — had locus standi to appeal the Division Bench's refusal of leave. Their senior counsel argued that the refusal was an error of law.
Counsel for respondent No. 1 countered that the FIRs had been registered pursuant to the ED's Section 66(2) communication, which prima facie disclosed a cognizable offence by the former Chief Minister, his daughter and his son-in-law under the Prevention of Corruption Act; that there was no requirement to hear the accused at registration; and that the Division Bench had rightly refused leave. He relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India [(2023) 12 SCC 1] for the proposition that the State is obliged to register an FIR on an ED Section 66(2) communication, with no right of hearing for the accused.
- Supreme Court: Pinarayi Vijayan v. K.M. Shajahan & Ors., SLP(Crl) Nos. 20437/2026, 20425/2026, 20471/2026, 20504/2026, 21 October 2026 (official signed order + record of proceedings)paras 4, 6, 11; PDF pp. 1–2, 4
- The Hindu: CMRL-Exalogic payoff case — Supreme Court stays probe on corruption FIR against former CM Pinarayi Vijayan, 21 October 2026 (identity background)identity of Pinarayi Vijayan (former Kerala Chief Minister, current Leader of the Opposition), daughter T. Veena, son-in-law and former Minister P.A. Mohamed Riyas; vacation special bench
Vijay Madanlal distinguished; the BNSS change noticed
The Court disagreed with the reliance on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary. This was not a case where the State, on receipt of a Section 66(2) communication, had registered a case on its own. The FIRs and the commencement of investigation were pursuant to a judicial order, in which the single judge had observed that the ED's materials disclosed a cognizable offence, making registration obligatory. If the appellants could not assail that finding on appeal, the Court said, it would stand against them in any independent proceeding challenging the FIRs.
The Court also noticed that judicial intervention for FIR registration has changed under the BNSS. Section 156(3) of the old Code did not require the participation of a public servant or his superior in the Magistrate's discretion; Section 175(4) of the BNSS now requires a Magistrate, before ordering investigation on a complaint against a public servant arising in the discharge of his official duties, to receive a report from the superior officer and to consider the public servant's assertions. The Court invoked this not on the merits but to show the new law's expansive room for a potential accused's participation before FIR registration.
Finally, the single judge had gone beyond the FIR direction mandated by Vijay Madanlal Choudhary — also ordering commencement of investigation and filing of a final report, which may require other statutory steps under the special law, including sanction under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Ten-day stay, limited to enabling interim relief
The Court held that the appellants clearly had locus, and that their prayer for leave had been incorrectly turned down. It set aside the impugned judgment and order, permitted the appellants to pursue their appeals before the Division Bench, and restored the appeals to file — making clear that its observations were confined to locus and expressed no opinion on the merits, with liberty to the appellants to seek interim relief in accordance with law.
The investigation in the impugned FIRs is stayed for ten days from 21 October 2026, expressly not as a conclusive opinion on interim relief; the Division Bench may fashion relief independently. The FIRs remain in place; only the investigation is paused. A subsequent ECIR registered in respect of the impugned FIRs was left untouched — the Court expressed no opinion on its validity and left it open to be agitated in appropriate proceedings.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
Leave to appeal is how a non-party challenges a judgment that affects them. The Court's test here was concrete: the single judge's finding that the Section 66(2) material disclosed a cognizable offence against the appellants would follow them into any future challenge to the FIRs, so refusing leave would have shut the door before they were ever heard. An aggrieved person, in other words, is one against whom the order makes a finding with consequences.
The Vijay Madanlal distinction is instructive: the obligation to register an FIR on an ED Section 66(2) communication governs executive action — it does not insulate a judicial direction to register an FIR from appellate scrutiny by the persons it names. And the reference to Section 175(4) of the BNSS, made without deciding its application to former public servants, flags how the new procedure's pre-investigation protections may become the battleground for future FIR-direction litigation.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- The appellants were not parties to the writ proceedings and were not heard by the single judge. On what basis did the Supreme Court hold that they had locus to appeal against the order directing FIR registration?
- How did the Supreme Court distinguish the reliance placed on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India regarding the State's obligation to register an FIR on an ED Section 66(2) communication?
- What was the precise scope and duration of the stay granted by the Court, and what did the Court expressly say about its effect on the Division Bench's power to decide interim relief?
