This judgment does NOT hold that a long relationship always defeats an allegation of rape or cheating, and it does NOT decide any civil or domestic-violence proceedings. It is a fact-specific discharge ruling: on this record, no prima facie case of the offences alleged was made out, so the prosecution could not continue. The Court expressly preserves the position of women genuinely kept entirely in the dark about a partner's earlier marriage.
- Case
- Santhosh Kumar N.P. v. State-Station House Officer, Kadirur Police, Tellicherry, Kannur District & Anr.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 1179
- Bench
- B.V. Nagarathna; R. Mahadevan
- Judgment by
- B.V. Nagarathna
- Case numbers
- SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10173-10174 of 2025
- Outcome
- Criminal appeals allowed. The Kerala High Court's common order dated 21 May 2025 and the trial court's orders are set aside; the appellant's discharge application is allowed and he stands discharged from the offences alleged under Sections 376, 420, 493, 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code.
Supreme Court discharges appellant; no prima facie case made out
The Supreme Court has discharged Santhosh Kumar N.P. from prosecution for rape, cheating and bigamy-related offences, holding that the trial court and the Kerala High Court ought to have discharged him rather than requiring him to face trial.
A Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice R. Mahadevan, with Justice Nagarathna writing, set aside the Kerala High Court's common order dated 21 May 2025 and the trial court's orders, allowed the discharge application, and allowed the criminal appeals.
The Court held that the ingredients of the offences under Sections 376, 420, 493, 494 and 495 were not established, that prima facie no case was made out, and that it was neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue.
A relationship from 1996, a 2008 domestic-violence case, and a 2011 FIR
Respondent No. 2, earlier married to one Divakaran and divorced, became acquainted with the appellant, and the acquaintance matured into a personal relationship. Her case was that he represented himself to be a bachelor and offered to marry her, that in 1996 they travelled to Mysuru where they were married at a temple, and that they resided together as a married couple until 2003, consenting to sexual acts on the presumption of a validly subsisting marriage.
In 2008, alleging neglect, she filed proceedings under Section 12(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-IV, Kozhikode, seeking alternate accommodation and expenses. There the appellant disclosed that he was earlier married with two children; the complaint was dismissed on 31 August 2009, and a criminal appeal against that dismissal was also dismissed.
She then filed a private complaint before the Additional Chief Magistrate, Thalassery, under Sections 376, 420, 493, 494 and 495, alleging deception. It was dismissed for non-prosecution on 4 April 2011, and a revision against that dismissal remains pending. A second, similar complaint was referred to the Kadirur Police under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and FIR No. 503/2011 was registered at Kadirur Police Station, Thalassery.
The appellant's Section 482 petition seeking quashing of the FIR was disposed of on 19 November 2013 with a direction to decide his discharge application expeditiously. By a common order dated 9 January 2015, the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Thalassery, dismissed the discharge petition, a territorial-jurisdiction challenge and a further-investigation application, holding that a prima facie case existed. The Kerala High Court, by its common order dated 21 May 2025, dismissed the appellant's revision and his petition against the refusal of further investigation, upholding that finding.
Did the record disclose a prima facie case at the discharge stage?
The question was whether the material made commission of the alleged offences probable or likely, the test at the discharge stage, rather than whether the offences were proved beyond reasonable doubt, the standard for conviction.
Discharge involves an individuated assessment of probability, considering not only the prosecution version but also other possibilities put forth by the accused; a sweeping pre-trial probe of the evidence is not permitted at that stage.
Within that framework, the Court examined whether each alleged offence was prima facie present: rape under Section 376 on the footing of consent under a misconception of fact, cheating under Section 420, and the marriage-related offences under Sections 493, 494 and 495.
The statutory ingredients, and the discharge test
Section 376 punishes rape as defined in Section 375, and Section 376(2)(n) covers rape committed repeatedly on the same woman. Section 420 punishes cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. Section 493 punishes cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage: the man must use deceitful means to convince a woman not lawfully married to him that she is, and then cohabit with her on that pretext.
Sections 494 and 495 punish entering into a subsequent marriage during a first spouse's lifetime, Section 495 applying where the earlier marriage is deliberately concealed. The Court set out those ingredients before testing them against the record.
On discharge, the Court reiterated the principles from Prafulla Kumar Samal and Sajjan Kumar: if the material makes commission of the offence probable or likely, discharge is not justified, but if that probability is weak or non-existent, discharge follows.
Knowledge within months, and seven more years of cohabitation
The decisive undisputed facts were that respondent No. 2 learned of the appellant's earlier marriage and two children within six months of cohabitation beginning in 1996, having been informed by the appellant's own brother, and that despite that knowledge she made no attempt to withdraw and continued to cohabit for seven more years, until 2003.
Continued cohabitation after acquiring that knowledge meant there was no possibility she was cohabiting on the premise of being the appellant's legally wedded wife, the Court held. Alleged temple rituals alone could not give rise to an assumption of lawful marriage, and no material indicated that the appellant had deceitfully induced her to marry him as his legally wedded wife.
Materials such as signatures on IVF-treatment documents and joint bank accounts suggested only a long-standing personal relationship, not a marriage. Respondent No. 2 could not, when queried in the domestic-violence proceedings, recollect the temple's name despite having lived in Mysuru for an extended period, and the priest's statement merely recorded that a marriage was performed, without details of the rituals required for a valid Hindu marriage. No valid marriage could therefore be said, prima facie, to have subsisted.
The Court stated the limits of its reasoning carefully. Consent may stand vitiated where a woman is genuinely kept entirely in the dark about her partner's earlier marriage, and Sections 376, 493, 494 and 495 would otherwise be illusory for women truly wronged. But that principle must be guided by facts and evidence in each case, not by mere allegations or moral presumptions. Criminal law cannot be used to settle personal scores, exact revenge or coerce a person to act in a particular way.
Discharge allowed; prosecution will not continue
On that analysis the Court concluded that none of the offences alleged was made out, that it was not at all probable that the appellant had committed them, and that the High Court had erred in finding sufficient material for a prima facie case, proceeding on a completely misconceived basis.
The discharge application was therefore allowed, the High Court's and trial court's orders were set aside, and the appellant stands discharged. The Court had earlier, on 18 July 2025, stayed further proceedings in Sessions Case No. 371/2013 while the appeals were pending.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students: discharge is about probability, not proof
The judgment illustrates the discharge standard: the court asks not whether the prosecution might eventually prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, but whether the material makes the offence probable or likely. Where admitted facts negate an essential ingredient, as here for Section 493, discharge follows even though the allegations are serious.
It also shows how courts distinguish two consent cases often confused: consent obtained by a false promise or concealment operating from the very start, which may vitiate consent, and a relationship that continues with knowledge of the true position, where later regret or breakdown does not retrospectively convert consent into an offence.
Finally, note what the judgment refuses to do: it does not moralise about the relationship or convert a failed relationship into a crime. Criminal liability must rest on statutory ingredients proved on the record, not on disapproval of personal choices.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- At the discharge stage, what standard does a court apply, and how does it differ from the standard for conviction?
- Why did the complainant's continued cohabitation after learning of the earlier marriage matter to the Section 493 case?
- Why does the Court insist that its ruling is fact-specific rather than a general rule about long relationships?
