This order does not de-reserve the 191-Kadipur Assembly Constituency, does not direct adoption of the rotation principle, and does not decide the validity of Section 9(1)(c) of the Delimitation Act, 2002 beyond holding that there is no ground to take a view different from the High Court's. The petitioner is left only with liberty to persuade elected representatives.
- Case
- Jagdish Singh v. Union of India & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Bench
- Surya Kant, CJI; Joymalya Bagchi; V. Mohana
- Case numbers
- SLP(C) 37437/2026
- Outcome
- Special Leave Petition disposed of with pending applications; High Court judgment dated 22 June 2026 in Writ Case No. 6153/2011 (Lucknow Bench) left undisturbed, with liberty to approach elected representatives.
Petition disposed of, High Court view left standing
The Supreme Court has disposed of Jagdish Singh's special leave petition against a judgment dated 22 June 2026 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Writ Case No. 6153/2011. The Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner and held that there was no ground to take a view different from that taken by the High Court.
The order, recorded on 4 November 2026 as Item No. 16 in Court No. 1, disposes of the petition together with pending applications, which included applications for exemption from filing the official translation and for permission to file additional documents.
The rotation argument and the Kadipur seat
The petition challenged the High Court's rejection of a challenge to the vires of Section 9(1)(c) of the Delimitation Act, 2002. The petitioner's case, in sum, was that reservation of State Legislative Assembly seats for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes should be governed by the principle of rotation.
Applied to the facts, that principle would allow the 191-Kadipur Assembly Constituency, which has remained reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates since its creation and was continued as reserved after the delimitation exercise undertaken in 2006, to be de-reserved, with some other constituency having the highest population of Scheduled Castes reserved in its place. The High Court rejected that contention, observing that although rotation may ideally be followed, the decision to undertake such an exercise falls within the domain of the legislature.
Reservation is essentially a legislative matter
The Supreme Court agreed. Reservation of seats in the State Legislative Assemblies and in Parliament, it held, is essentially a matter falling within the domain of the legislature. That single proposition disposes of the petition: a court is not to substitute its own view of ideal rotation for the legislature's choice about how reserved seats are allocated.
The Court did, however, preserve a political route. The petitioner, if so advised, may approach elected representatives with a view to persuading them to consider adopting the principle of rotation, as relied upon by the petitioner on the basis of observations made by the Delimitation Commission in 2006. That liberty is not a direction to any authority and creates no legal entitlement to de-reservation.
What this order does not decide
Read strictly, the order is narrow. It records no finding that rotation would be unconstitutional or undesirable, and equally no finding that Section 9(1)(c) must be read to require rotation. It does not disturb the delimitation of any constituency, and it does not lay down any timetable or procedure for reconsidering reservation of seats.
For the petitioner, therefore, the legal challenge ends with the High Court's judgment intact, and the only avenue the order opens is persuasion of elected representatives. Any change to the reservation status of Kadipur or any other constituency would require legislative or delimitation action, not a further order in this petition.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students: deference, not indifference
This short order is a good example of judicial deference stated without deciding the underlying policy merits. The Court does not say rotation is a bad idea; the High Court itself said it may ideally be followed. The point is institutional: who decides?
When you meet a case like this in an examination, separate three layers carefully: the statutory provision under challenge, the policy principle the petitioner invokes, and the forum the Court says must decide between them. Conflating the second and third layers is the most common error, and this order avoids it by granting liberty to persuade the legislature rather than relief against it.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- What was the petitioner's rotation argument, and why did it centre on the 191-Kadipur constituency?
- Why did both the High Court and the Supreme Court treat the decision to rotate reserved seats as a legislative matter?
- What exactly does the liberty granted by the Supreme Court allow the petitioner to do, and what does it not decide?
