This order does NOT quash FIR No. 678 of 2026: the Court expressly recorded that it had not expressed any opinion on the FIR's contents, the investigation continues (the petitioner is to cooperate), and the petitioner is at liberty to challenge the FIR before the jurisdictional High Court. The protection from arrest is stayed ‘until further orders’, and the notice to X was quashed on the facts of this case.
- Case
- Abhishek Upadhyay v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Bench
- CJI Surya Kant; Joymalya Bagchi, J
- Case numbers
- W.P.(Crl.) No. 339/2026
- Outcome
- Record of proceedings in W.P.(Crl.) No. 339/2026, disposed of on 14-10-2026: interim protection from coercive action made absolute (arrest stayed until further orders); the 22.08.2026 notice to X under Section 94 BNSS quashed; any information already taken barred from use against the petitioner.
What the Court did
The Supreme Court on 14 October 2026 quashed a 22 August 2026 notice issued by the Crime Branch Investigation Unit, Ghaziabad to the social media platform X, which had asked X to hand over about three months of digital data linked to journalist Abhishek Upadhyay's account. In the same order, the Bench of the Chief Justice and Justice Joymalya Bagchi made absolute its earlier interim orders protecting Upadhyay from arrest and other coercive action in FIR No. 678 of 2026.
The Court also laid down a rule with wider reach: no confidential or personal information of an accused can be obtained for any period before the date of the offence, and even information relating to the period after the FIR cannot be sought unless adequate measures are in place to preserve privacy and the principles of proportionality are applied — that is, only when alternative ways of taking the investigation to a logical conclusion are found inadequate. Any information already taken under the quashed notice ‘shall not be utilised’ against the petitioner.
The FIR and the reporting behind it
The petition was filed under Article 32 seeking quashing of FIR No. 678 of 2026, registered at Police Station Indirapuram, Ghaziabad, and consequential protection from arrest. The petitioner is an investigative journalist operating the digital news platform ‘Top Secret’. In June 2026, he had published a series of reports concerning alleged misappropriation of offerings and other irregularities at the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Temple, Ayodhya.
The FIR, by contrast, alleges a road-rage incident on 18.08.2026 near Shipra Mall, Ghaziabad: the petitioner, while returning after taking his minor daughter from school, is alleged to have struck his car into the complainant's motorcycle from behind, and to have abused and threatened the complainant and made remarks after inquiring about his name and caste. These are the allegations as recorded in the FIR; the petitioner has denied that any such incident occurred and alleges that the occurrence was staged because of his reporting. The order also records that a copy of the FIR had not been supplied to the petitioner at the time he approached the Court.
The 25 August interim order
When the matter came up on 25.08.2026, the Court issued notice and passed a protective interim order: no coercive action would be taken against the petitioner in FIR No. 678/2026, or in any subsequent FIR that might be registered against him in relation to the subject-allegations. It also directed that a copy of the FIR be supplied to him so that he could seek legal remedies against it, and asked the Commissioner of Police, Ghaziabad to file a compliance affidavit. Once the FIR copy was supplied, the petitioner was to be at liberty to approach the jurisdictional High Court for relief.
In deference to that order, a copy of the FIR has since been supplied to the petitioner, the 14 October order records.
The notice to X and the police's explanation
Meanwhile, the petitioner discovered that on 22.08.2026 — two days after the FIR was registered — the Crime Branch Investigation Unit, Ghaziabad had issued a notice to X asking the platform to furnish the petitioner's digital information for three months before the registration of the FIR. He filed an application seeking an interim-cum-final direction to stay and quash that notice and restrain the police from seeking or using any information from his X account, @upadhyayabhii.
In the Commissioner's affidavit, the police said that after the FIR was registered on 20.08.2026, efforts to locate the petitioner on 20–22.08.2026 failed, and the notice to X's nodal officer was issued ‘for the limited purpose of tracing the petitioner's whereabouts and facilitating arrest/investigation’. The Court noted that, in view of its interim order of 25.08.2026, the purpose of tracing the petitioner had become irrelevant. The petitioner, on his part, disputed the police's clarification and asked for a fresh, specific compliance affidavit addressing the production of the notice under Section 94 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.
The rule: privacy, proportionality, and the exclusion of the data
The Court then examined what the notice actually demanded: the petitioner's log-in IP, log-out IP, alternative email ID, mobile number, location access (latitude and longitude), mobile device, IMEI number, name, address, phone number, registration IP logs and IP access logs, for the period 01.06.2026 to 22.08.2026 — ‘a period that largely is prior to the date of the alleged road-rage incident’ of 18.08.2026. It found the police's explanation — that the data was needed to trace and arrest the petitioner — ‘in contradiction’ with the contents of the notice.
On that basis it laid down the governing rule in paragraph 12: no confidential or personal information of the petitioner can be obtained for the period prior to the date of the offence; and even information pertaining to the period after the registration of the FIR cannot be sought unless adequate measures are in place to preserve the privacy of personal data and the principles of proportionality are applied — that is, when alternative measures to take the investigation to a logical conclusion are found inadequate. The Court noted that no such plea had been raised by the respondents. The notice was accordingly quashed, and any information taken pursuant to it ‘or otherwise, shall not be utilised against the petitioner.’
Protection made absolute; the investigation continues
The Court made absolute its orders of 25.08.2026 read with 07.09.2026: ‘the arrest of the petitioner shall remain stayed until further orders’, on the petitioner's voluntary statement that he will cooperate with the ongoing investigation. Since the FIR copy has now been supplied, he is at liberty to challenge it before the jurisdictional High Court in accordance with law — all grounds of challenge remaining available to him, the Court having expressed no opinion on the FIR's contents. The writ petition and all applications stand disposed of in these terms.
Two further directions complete the picture. First, the petitioner may approach a court of competent jurisdiction in appropriate proceedings to lay down mandatory guidelines for the collection of personal and digital data during investigations; meanwhile, the paragraph-12 restriction on obtaining his data continues. Second, the petitioner's vehicle, seized during the investigation, is to be released forthwith and not later than two days.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
Three features of this order deserve attention. First, the forum: the petitioner approached the Supreme Court directly under Article 32 — a reminder that preventive protection against coercive process in a criminal case can be sought as a fundamental-rights remedy where liberty is at stake, though the Court ultimately pushed the merits of the FIR challenge to the High Court.
Second, the Section 94 BNSS issue: the power to compel production of documents and information from intermediaries is not unlimited. The Court treated a backward-looking demand — three months of data predating the offence — as incompatible with the stated investigative purpose, and read a proportionality discipline into the power: privacy safeguards first, and a showing that alternatives are inadequate.
Third, the exclusionary direction: quashing the notice was not enough; the Court barred any use of the information obtained. That is the practical bite of the ruling — without the ‘shall not be utilised’ direction, the quashing would have been hollow for data already handed over. Note, too, the Court's restraint: nothing here decides whether the FIR is genuine or staged. That question, and the quashing prayer itself, now go to the jurisdictional High Court.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- The Court quashed the 22.08.2026 notice to X. What was the legal test it laid down for when police may — and may not — obtain a person's confidential or personal information during an investigation?
- The Court made absolute its orders of 25.08.2026 and 07.09.2026, but also said the petitioner must cooperate with the investigation. What does ‘made absolute’ mean for the interim protection, and why did cooperation matter?
- The order says any information taken pursuant to the quashed notice ‘shall not be utilised’ against the petitioner. What remedy does this resemble, and why did the Court impose it even while disposing of the writ petition?
