What this judgment does NOT decide: it does not make co-operative societies public authorities under the RTI Act, and it does not give unconnected third parties a right to a society's internal documents; the member-specific limit in the judgment stands.
- Case
- The Muppathadam Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. The State Chief Information Commissioner & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 1153
- Bench
- J. B. Pardiwala; K. Vinod Chandran
- Judgment by
- K. Vinod Chandran
- Case numbers
- Civil Appeal No. 13906 of 2026; Civil Appeal No. 13907 of 2026
- Outcome
- Final judgment dismissing the bank's civil appeals; the Kerala High Court Division Bench's direction stands, with the Registrar to supply the two documents within two weeks.
What the Court decided
On 26 October 2026, a Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran dismissed the Muppathadam Service Co-operative Bank's appeals and upheld the Kerala High Court Division Bench's direction that a member of the bank is entitled to two documents through the Right to Information Act, 2005.
The Joint Registrar (General) of Co-operative Societies, the second respondent, must call for the two documents immediately and in any event within two weeks, and supply them to the member, the fourth respondent. The documents are the construction agreement between the bank and a labour co-operative society entrusted with building construction, and the minutes of the bank's last general body meeting.
How the request travelled
The fourth respondent, a member of the bank appearing in person, persistently pursued an application under the RTI Act before the Joint Registrar (General) of Co-operative Societies, seeking the construction agreement and the minutes of the last general body meeting.
His first application was rejected at every stage up to the State Information Commissioner; a challenge before a Single Judge failed, but the Division Bench directed reconsideration. In the second round, the Information Commissioner, the Single Judge and the Division Bench all affirmed his right to the documents. The Division Bench's judgment was challenged before the Supreme Court.
The bank's case
The bank argued that it is not a 'public authority' under the RTI Act, relying on Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, and that the Registrar's access to its documents under Sections 65 and 66 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, arises only after the Registrar records a subjective satisfaction to hold an inquiry.
On that argument, since no such satisfaction had been recorded or called for while considering the member's application, the Registrar should be treated as having no access to the bank's documents, and the documents, held by a private entity, could not be 'information' under the RTI Act. The bank also invoked the Supreme Court's decision in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, on access by a public authority to information relating to a private body.
The issue
The question was whether the Registrar can access a co-operative society's documents for RTI purposes without first recording satisfaction to hold an inquiry, and whether the two documents — a concluded construction contract and general body minutes sought by a member — are barred by the exemptions in Section 8(1)(d) and (j) of the RTI Act.
The Division Bench had held that Section 2(f) of the RTI Act, which defines 'information' to include information relating to a private body 'which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force', emphasises the Registrar's entitlement to obtain documents from the private body and extends beyond mere physical custody.
The Court's reasoning
Section 2(f) covers not only material physically available with a public authority but also material relating to a private body which a public authority can access on the strength of statutory powers. The words 'can be accessed' refer to access being statutorily provided, the Court held, and the power cannot be fettered by treating a pre-imposed condition as a bar in every case: where access is subject to a condition, access is enabled when the condition is satisfied or the restriction stands removed.
On Sections 65 and 66, the Court held there is no fetter on the Registrar's access to documents, and the prior satisfaction required is only to initiate an inquiry. That satisfaction cannot be entered in a vacuum: Section 65(2) gives the Registrar or his authorised person free access at all reasonable times to the books, accounts, documents, securities, cash and other properties of a society. When something amiss comes to the Registrar's notice, or is brought to his notice through an application, he can enter the satisfaction only if he has access to the society's documents first. Access simpliciter therefore cannot be conditioned on a prior satisfaction.
Section 66 separately confers supervisory and inspection powers, exercisable as frequently as the Registrar considers necessary, including inspection of the books of the society; amendments to the Kerala Act had enlarged Section 66 by sub-sections (4A) and (11), the latter a non-obstante clause empowering inquiry with the society's records and periodic inspection.
The exemptions also failed. Section 8(1)(d), covering commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property affecting a third party's competitive position, did not apply: the bid was over, one labour contract society had obtained the contract, and its terms are matters any member would be concerned with. Section 8(1)(j), covering personal information, did not apply either: a construction contract entered into by the bank and the minutes of its general body meeting, sought by a member, cannot be termed personal information of the society, and the absence of a public activity or interest is not significant enough to decline the request if the documents are otherwise accessible.
Outcome and limits
The Division Bench's judgment was held to be perfectly in order and in accordance with the law and the decisions cited. The appeals were dismissed, and the Registrar must call for the two documents immediately and in any event within two weeks and supply them to the fourth respondent.
The Court drew an express limit: the position would definitely be different if a third party not connected with the society raised an identical request. Every citizen does not have the right to ask for the documents, because personal information under Section 8(1)(j) is not confined to a natural person and extends to a private entity whose affairs a wholly unconnected citizen has no interest in, unless the matter relates to a public activity. A member of the society, however, cannot be denied such information on the ground that it is personal to the society or lacks a public activity or interest.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
The doctrinal core is the distinction between custody and access. Thalappalam decides that a co-operative society is not itself a public authority; this judgment does not disturb that, but holds that information a public authority can statutorily access is still 'information' under Section 2(f). Do not conflate the two holdings.
The second move worth noting is the Court's inversion of the bank's sequencing argument: satisfaction to inquire cannot precede access, because the Registrar needs the documents to decide whether an inquiry is warranted at all. That 'access simpliciter' point is the reason the two-week direction follows as a matter of course.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why does Section 2(f)'s phrase 'can be accessed by a public authority' matter even though the bank is not itself a public authority?
- Why did the Court reject the argument that the Registrar needs prior satisfaction before accessing the documents?
- Why would an identical request by a stranger to the society fail where this member's request succeeded?
