The judgment decides only the scope of a Letters Patent Bench's appellate jurisdiction over a writ court's decision. It does not decide whether the disciplinary charges against R. Saravanan were in fact proved; it holds that the inquiry findings were perverse for want of evidence and that the Division Bench had no cogent ground to interfere. Consequential service benefits, if any, flow from the restored writ court order.
- Case
- R. Saravanan v. Periyar University (Rep. by its Registrar) & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 1136
- Bench
- Prashant Kumar Mishra; Shree Chandrashekhar
- Judgment by
- Shree Chandrashekhar, J.
- Case numbers
- Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) 4216/2020
- Outcome
- Civil appeal allowed; the Division Bench's judgment dated 29 August 2019 in W.A. No. 2329 of 2018 is set aside and the Single Judge's decision in W.P. No. 23936 of 2013 is restored. No order as to costs.
The ruling
On 16 October 2026, the Supreme Court restored a Madras High Court Single Judge's order quashing the removal of a Periyar University officer, setting aside a Division Bench judgment that had reversed the writ court after re-examining the inquiry evidence.
Justice Shree Chandrashekhar, writing for a Bench of himself and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, framed the case as a question of the limits of an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Madras High Court's Letters Patent: can a Division Bench interfere with a writ court's decision under Article 226 merely because it holds a different view?
The service dispute
R. Saravanan joined Periyar University as Assistant Registrar on 2 May 2000 and was working as Deputy Registrar when the Department of Higher Education received a complaint about his assets. The University first constituted a three-member committee, which the Court records stalled after Saravanan allegedly threatened its members and refused to cooperate; a One-man Commission headed by a retired judicial officer was then constituted on 19 April 2011 to inquire into the allegations.
Fourteen charges were eventually put to him; the removal order of 26 July 2013 rested on three. Charge 1 alleged he had influenced the grant of affiliation to Ganga College of Education, where his wife was a Managing Trustee. Charge 4 alleged a house property at Periyar Nagar stood in his mother's name but was purchased by him without the University's permission. Charge 10 alleged he had bought a Santro car worth Rs. 4 lakh beyond his known sources of income. He challenged the removal in W.P. No. 23936 of 2013.
What the writ court found
The Single Judge examined the One-man Commission's report and held that its findings were not based on any material on record. Relying on Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel ((1976) 1 SCC 518) and Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration ((1984) 4 SCC 635) — which hold that a finding with no evidence to support it is perverse — the writ court quashed the removal order.
The University appealed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench, in W.A. No. 2329 of 2018, re-appreciated the domestic-inquiry material, concluded the Commission's report was corroborated by documentary evidence, and restored the removal.
The evidence gap
The Supreme Court went charge by charge through the Commission's reasoning. On Charge 1, the report held the charge 'proved' on the ground that the appellant 'could have' influenced the affiliation grant: 'Since the deliquent (sic) was in the responsible position in the University, influence of this position in the University granting affiliation for the Ganga College during the year 2007 could not be ruled out. Hence the charge is proved.' No witness had said anything linking Saravanan to the affiliation decision.
On Charge 4, the Commission reasoned that because Saravanan had not produced the title deed and had paid the housing-loan instalments from his salary account, he — not his mother — was the real owner of the house. On Charge 10, the mere absence of the University's permission for the car purchase and the loan was treated as proved misconduct.
The Court held these were conjectures and surmises, not evidence: an inquiry officer must sift evidence and arrive at the truth; he is not entitled to presume guilt or return findings on mere assumptions.
The rule on Letters Patent interference
The Court traced Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court (1865, amended 1927) and the line of authority — Asha Devi, B. Venkatamuni, Gaudiya Mission, Sachida Nand Lal, Chatti Konati Rao, and the five-judge Bench in Alapati Kasi Viswanatham — confirming that a Letters Patent appeal lies on questions of fact as well as law.
But, the Court stressed, that jurisdiction is fettered. A Letters Patent Bench 'is required to give due weight to the decision of the writ Court where it has exercised its discretion on relevant considerations', and it can interfere 'only where the findings are demonstrably erroneous and the mistake is glaring on the face of record'. There must be cogent grounds; a minor mistake in the judgment under challenge is not enough. 'The Letters Patent Bench can not interfere with the decision rendered by the writ Court which is otherwise just and reasonable.'
Applying that test, the Court found the Division Bench had interfered 'without any cogent and justifiable reason' in a matter where 'no ground for interference was available'. It set aside the Division Bench's 29 August 2019 judgment and restored the writ court's decision, allowing the appeal with no order as to costs.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
The judgment is a compact lesson in the difference between 'appraisal of evidence' and 'total lack of evidence'. The first is the tribunal's job; a writ court cannot convert itself into a court of appeal. But a finding of perversity — a finding supported by no material at all — is not a factual disagreement; following Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan, it is an error of law, and certiorari lies.
Notice also how the Court handled the 'alternate remedy' objection: Rule 19 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules gave Saravanan a statutory appeal, but the Court treated exhaustion of remedies as a self-imposed restraint, not a bar. A writ court may step in where the punishment is removal from service — 'the harshest measure of punishment' with 'cascading effects' on the employee's family — and the inquiry is perverse.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the Supreme Court hold that the One-man Commission's finding on Charge 1 was perverse, and what distinguishes that from a mere disagreement about evidence?
- Under this judgment, when may a Letters Patent Bench interfere with a Single Judge's exercise of discretion under Article 226, and what test must it apply?
- Why did the Court not relegate Saravanan to his statutory appeal under Rule 19 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955?
