This judgment decides only that Narender Kumar's Rheumatoid Arthritis claim falls within Category E(i) for War Injury Pension; it does not quantify any pension amount or arrears, does not decide his other two disabilities, and does not rewrite the pension scheme. The operative appeal is dismissed, so the Tribunal and High Court orders in his favour stand.
- Case
- Union of India & Ors. v. Narender Kumar
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 1166
- Bench
- Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha; Alok Aradhe
- Judgment by
- Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
- Case numbers
- Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 27220 of 2026
- Outcome
- Final judgment dismissing the Union of India's civil appeal; the Armed Forces Tribunal and High Court orders granting War Injury Pension for Rheumatoid Arthritis stand.
Supreme Court dismisses the Union's appeal
The Supreme Court has dismissed the Union of India's appeal against concurrent orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal and the High Court granting War Injury Pension to Narender Kumar, a former soldier whose Rheumatoid Arthritis developed during his posting at Kargil under Operation Rakshak.
A bench of Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe held that once the Government notifies an operation under Category E(i) of the Ministry of Defence policy on pensionary benefits, the benefit follows unless the policy or the notification itself says otherwise. The Court found no such exclusion for Operation Rakshak, rejecting the Ministry's argument that the operation was never intended to be covered.
The judgment, delivered on 28 October 2026, directs the Government to state in clear terms in every future notification whether the benefit applies.
A Kargil posting, a 2013 discharge, and a claim made six years later
Narender Kumar was enrolled in the Indian Army on 30 December 1996. While posted at Kargil from 13 July 2003 to 6 July 2005, he was diagnosed with Rheumatoid Arthritis (Seropositive). He was later diagnosed with two prolapsed intervertebral disc conditions while posted in West Bengal.
When he was discharged on 31 January 2013, the Release Medical Board accepted all three disabilities as aggravated by military service at 70 per cent for life, rounded off to 75 per cent. Having served more than 16 years, he was granted Disability Pension.
About six years later, he approached the Armed Forces Tribunal seeking War Injury Pension under Part II, Category E(i), paragraph 4.1 of the Ministry of Defence Policy Letter dated 31 January 2001, instead of Disability Pension for the arthritis, on the ground that it was a direct consequence of his Kargil posting.
The Tribunal and the High Court both ruled for the soldier
The Ministry opposed the application, principally on the ground that the disability was not covered by Category E(i), paragraph 4.1. By its order dated 8 April 2024, the Tribunal allowed the application, holding that the arthritis had originated in January 2005 while Kumar served at Kargil with 14F RAJ RIF, that the entire Jammu and Kashmir area is an operational area, and that the Ministry's argument — that the disability was not caused by enemy action, peacekeeping, terrorist violence or border skirmishes — had no substance.
The Tribunal concluded that Kumar had made out a clear case for the War Injury Element under Category E(i), paragraph 4.1. The Ministry's challenge to that decision was dismissed by the High Court on 11 August 2025, on the ground that the Release Medical Board's opinion proved the arthritis originated while Kumar was actually posted at Kargil between 2003 and 2005.
The question: what does 'operations specially notified' cover?
Before the Supreme Court, the short point was whether Kumar's belated claim fell under Category E(i), paragraph 4.1. Category E deals with death or disability arising out of nine circumstances in the nature of an actual war or a war-like situation, ending with sub-category (i) — 'operations specially notified by the Government from time to time'.
The Additional Solicitor General argued that Category E(i) covered only operations specially notified by the Government such as Operation Sindoor or Operation Snow Leopard, not ongoing operations like Operation Rakshak (the whole of Jammu and Kashmir) or Operation Rhino (the whole of Assam). She warned that Kumar's reading would render the other Category E clauses otiose and entitle every soldier posted in Jammu and Kashmir under Operation Rakshak to War Injury Pension, and she relied on paragraph 44 of Army Order 01 of 2003, under which battle casualty reports are not initiated in ongoing operations.
Kumar's counsel answered that Operation Rakshak at Kargil is an integral part of the operations specially notified by the Government, that several High Courts have held War Injury Pension admissible for disabilities arising out of postings in such notified areas, and that clause (g) of Appendix 'A' to Army Order 1 of 2003 treats casualties occurring while operating on the International Border or the Line of Control due to natural calamities and illness caused by climatic conditions as battle casualties — making his disability directly attributable to the climatic conditions at the Line of Control at Kargil.
Plain language first: a notified operation is covered unless excluded
The Court held that sub-category E(i) exists precisely to give the defence administration flexibility, because not every war-like situation can fit within sub-categories (a) to (h). Going by the plain language of the policy, once a notification is issued for a specific operation, Category E(i) is invoked, unless there is something indicative either in the policy or in the notification so issued. Apart from the Additional Solicitor General's oral statement that Operation Rakshak was not intended to be covered, the Court found no other interpretative aid for excluding it.
The judgment places the burden squarely on the policymaker: the power to prescribe a policy's applicability lies with the defence administration, but its formulations must clearly articulate their scope, and an interpretation that runs against the plain language, or is discriminatory, arbitrary or irrational, will be disregarded. 'While interpreting the plain language of the policy, Courts will simply declare, What a policy says, it is and not what is in the imagination of the policymaker,' the Court said.
Because sub-category E(i) is enabling and its language unrestrictive, the Court held the policy must apply where it does not indicate which notified operations fall outside it — particularly for pensionary benefits, where a liberal interpretation is compelling. It declined to rely on Army Order 1 of 2003, observing that the order causes more confusion than it clarifies.
The Court also recorded its concern at the continuing uncertainty about which Ministry of Defence rules and policies apply, observing that it is high time the Ministry issued a comprehensive, clearly identifiable subordinate legislation governing the services.
Appeal dismissed — and a direction for future notifications
For these reasons, the Court saw no reason to take a different view from the Tribunal or the High Court, and dismissed the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 27220 of 2026 against the High Court's 11 August 2025 order in CWP No. 23117 of 2025. Pending applications stood disposed of.
At the same time, the Court directed that while notifying operations under Category E(i), the Government must declare in clear terms whether the paragraph 4.1, Category E(i) pensionary benefits would apply to such a notification or not — so that the next dispute of this kind does not turn on an oral assertion about what a notification was intended to mean.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students: why this case matters beyond one pension
This is a compact lesson in reading benefits policies. First, text beats intention as asserted in court: where a policy says 'operations specially notified by the Government from time to time' without carving any notified operation out, the Court refused to read in an exclusion the Government had never written down.
Second, the burden of clarity lies with the policymaker. One that wants to limit a benefit must do so in the policy or the notification itself, not by an oral submission years later, and it cannot expect the Court to narrow unrestrictive language by interpretation, especially for pensionary benefits.
Third, note what the case does not do. It does not rewrite the pension scheme, decide Kumar's other two disabilities, or work out any arrears figure — the appeal concerned only whether the arthritis claim fell within Category E(i). The Court's remedy for the underlying mess is institutional: write the next notification clearly.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- Why did the Court hold that Operation Rakshak fell within Category E(i) even though the Ministry argued it was an ongoing operation rather than a specially notified one?
- On whom does the judgment place the burden of showing that a notified operation is excluded from Category E(i), and what must the policymaker do to discharge that burden?
- What direction did the Court give for future notifications under Category E(i), and what problem is that direction meant to prevent?
