The Court did not decide the validity of Section 17A itself — that question stands referred to a larger Bench in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India. The ruling decides only that Section 17A has no application on these facts. It also does not decide the appellant's guilt, which is for the trial.
- Case
- Tejaram v. State of Rajasthan
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decision
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 1147
- Bench
- S. V. N. Bhatti; N. V. Anjaria
- Judgment by
- N. V. Anjaria
- Case numbers
- Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11709 of 2025
- Outcome
- Criminal appeal dismissed; the charge under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act stands; the trial is to proceed on the merits.
The judgment
On 16 October 2026, in a reportable judgment authored by Justice N. V. Anjaria, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal appeal of Tejaram, a Rajasthan police constable facing trial for demanding a bribe of Rs.1.5 lakh. The Court ruled that Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — which bars enquiry or investigation into offences 'relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken' by a public servant in discharge of official functions without prior approval — is not attracted where the allegation is a demand for illegal gratification. Such a demand, the Court held, is 'a pure criminal act, not connected with official functions'.
The consequence is direct: the want of prior approval under Section 17A did not vitiate the investigation, the charge framed under Section 7 of the PC Act stands, and the trial will proceed on its merits.
How the case reached the Court
Tejaram was a constable posted at the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sirohi. The complainant, Devendra Kumar — also a constable, posted at Abu City, Sirohi — alleged that Tejaram had demanded a bribe of Rs.1.5 lakh on behalf of the Superintendent of Police. On the complainant's email of 22 April 2021, FIR No. 174 of 2021 was registered on 4 June 2021 under Section 7A of the PC Act and Section 120B of the IPC; Tejaram was arrested on 1 September 2021.
Sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the PC Act was granted on 8 December 2023, a chargesheet was filed on 19 January 2024, and the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pali framed a charge under Section 7 of the PC Act (as amended in 2018) on 12 September 2024 in Sessions Case No. 2 of 2024. Tejaram's challenge to the framing of charge failed before the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur, which dismissed his Criminal Revision Petition No. 1608 of 2024 on 26 March 2025.
The appellant's case
Tejaram's principal contention, advanced by senior counsel, was that as a public servant he could not be investigated without the prior approval of the competent authority under Section 17A; that the provision was mandatory and created a bar which could not be cured at a later stage. The High Court, he argued, had erred in relying on Nara Chandrababu Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh while disregarding Yashwant Sinha v. CBI ((2020) 2 SCC 338), and the question whether Sections 17A and 19 are procedural or substantive was in any case pending before the Court in B.S. Yeddyurappa v. A. Alam Pasha (2025 SCC OnLine SC 836).
The State of Rajasthan countered that Section 17A does not give blanket immunity for all actions of public servants: criminal acts unrelated to official duties cannot be protected, and a demand for illegal gratification was in no way part of the discharge of Tejaram's official functions nor relatable to any recommendation or decision in discharge of duty.
The test for Section 17A
The Court began with the provision's text. Section 17A bars a police officer from enquiring into or investigating an offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under the PC Act 'where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken' by a public servant in discharge of official functions without the previous approval of the competent authority. The first proviso dispenses with approval for on-the-spot arrests for accepting or attempting to accept undue advantage.
The decisive phrase, the Court held, is 'discharge his official functions or duties': two primary and essential ingredients must be present — a 'decision' or 'recommendation' by the public servant, and that it be taken or made in discharge of official functions or duties. Though the legislature intended to protect public servants by engrafting Section 17A into the statute, 'the protection envisaged could be extended only if the conditions contemplated in the Section are satisfied. The Section cannot be viewed to have an omnibus application.'
A consistent line of authority
The Court found the judicial view 'consistent and categorical'. In CBI v. Santosh Karnani (2023 SCC OnLine SC 427), the contention that proceedings were vitiated for want of Section 17A approval was rejected: prior approval to investigate an officer accused of demanding a bribe in a trap case would 'defeat the very purpose of trap and the investigation', and the accusation did not revolve around recommendations or decisions in a quasi-judicial or administrative capacity. The same view was followed in Surendra Dhariwal v. State of Rajasthan (Criminal Appeal Nos. 3717-3718 of 2025, decided 25 August 2025).
Most recently, in Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan (2026 SCC OnLine SC 807) — also a case of demand of illegal gratification — the Court had called the Section 17A submission 'thoroughly misconceived': 'Section 17-A by any stretch of imagination cannot be applied to cases of demand of illegal gratification.' The Kerala High Court's decisions in Shankara Bhat (2021 SCC OnLine Ker 16357) and M.R. Simon (2024 SCC OnLine Ker 7255) were cited to the same effect: offences like misappropriation, cheating, criminal breach of trust and receiving bribes lie beyond the provision's scope.
Disposal and limits
Applying that test, the Court held that none of Section 17A's ingredients was satisfied: 'the act of demanding a bribe is a pure criminal act, not connected with official functions and not relatable to or having any linkage with recommendation or decision of the appellant in his capacity, as public servant.' The larger-Bench reference on Section 17A's validity (Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, order dated 13 January 2026 in W.P.(C) No. 1373 of 2018) had 'no connection' with this case, which could be decided without awaiting it.
On the belated Section 19 sanction, the Court held that since sanction was taken before cognizance, it amounted to a mere irregularity that could not vitiate the entire proceedings and the trial. The High Court was justified in dismissing the revision petition; the appeal stands dismissed, and the trial will be conducted on its merits with both sides free to raise their contentions.
BANTHRY ANALYSISFor law students
This judgment is the cleanest recent statement of a distinction students often blur: Section 17A protects decision-making, Section 19 governs prosecution sanction, and neither protects crime. Read the provision's operative words — 'relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken ... in discharge of his official functions or duties' — as a two-gate filter: first identify the decision or recommendation, then ask whether it was an official one. A bribe demand fails at the first gate.
Note the Court's technique for handling the pending larger-Bench reference: a reference on a provision's validity does not freeze every case touching that provision — if the provision is not attracted on the facts, the case can be decided independently. And on sanction: the Court separates the Section 17A question (prior approval to investigate) from the Section 19 question (sanction to prosecute), treating a belated-but-pre-cognizance Section 19 sanction as a curable irregularity rather than a jurisdictional defect.
READING PROMPTSQuestions for a closer reading
- What are the two essential ingredients that must be satisfied before Section 17A of the PC Act is attracted?
- Why did the Court hold that a demand for illegal gratification cannot be described as a 'recommendation or decision in discharge of official functions'?
- The validity of Section 17A is before a larger Bench. Why could the Court still decide this appeal without awaiting that reference?
